Dear
Member of Parliament,
The
Indo-U.S. bilateral agreement on nuclear cooperation has raised a number of
issues which are of vital importance to the nation. Through this open letter we
wish to place before you the considered views of the Communist Party of India
(Marxist).
Ever
since the Joint Statement issued in July 2005 during the Prime Minister’s
visit to Washington in which the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement was
announced, there has been a debate in the country about the merits of such an
agreement. Political parties, nuclear scientists, the media and concerned
citizens have been expressing their views. Parliament has also discussed the
agreement at various stages. However, the current debate is crucial as the bilateral text
has been finalised and the Government is planning to take the next steps to
operationalise the agreement.
It
is our contention that the nuclear cooperation agreement should not be seen in
isolation from the overall context of India-US strategic relations, its impact
on our foreign policy and our strategic autonomy. Further, the nuclear
cooperation agreement must be seen in the context of our energy security, access
to technology and the development of the three stage nuclear programme.
The
bilateral "123" agreement has also to be seen also in the light of the
assurances given by the Prime Minister in his statement to Parliament on 17
August 2007.
The
Left parties have asked the Government not to proceed with the next steps to be
taken to operationalise the agreement.
Implications of the Hyde
Act
Members
of Parliament will recall that in August 2006, there was a debate on the draft
law being discussed by the US Senate and the House of Representatives to amend
the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to give exemption for the proposed
nuclear cooperation agreement with
India. The two draft legislations
before the House of Representatives and the Senate contain many provisions which
were detrimental to India’s interests.
The
Prime Minister had given certain
categorical assurances on the points raised regarding this draft legislation.
The nine points which the Left parties had raised were covered by the
Prime Minister’s statement. However,
subsequent to that, the Hyde Act (Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful
Atomic Energy Cooperation Act” was adopted by the US Congress in December
2006.
Many
of the provisions of the Hyde Act go contrary to the assurances given by the
Prime Minister in August 2006. What
are these?
·
Under the terms set out by the Hyde Act, it is
clear that the Indo-US nuclear cooperation would not cover the entire nuclear
fuel cycle. It denies cooperation or access in any form whatsoever
to fuel enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production technologies.
·
The denial extends to transfer of dual use
technology and covers items which could be used in fuel enrichment, reprocessing
or heavy water production facilities. Thus,
dual use restrictions remain on technology transfers to India.
Hyde Act section 102 (13) states, “The US should not seek to facilitate
or encourage the continuation of nuclear
exports to India by any other party if such exports are terminated under US
law”.
·
Section 103 (a)(6) of the Hyde Act says US
policy shall be “Seek to prevent the transfer to a country (India, in this
case) nuclear equipment, materials or technology from other participating
governments in the NSG or from any other source if nuclear transfers to that
country (India, in this case) are suspended or terminated pursuant to this title
(Hyde Act), the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 or any other US law”.
The
Act concerns itself with areas outside nuclear cooperation and contains
objectionable clauses to get India to accept the strategic goals of the United
States. These issues are:
·
Annual certification and reporting to the US
Congress by the President on a variety of foreign policy issues such as
India’s foreign policy being “congruent to that of the United States” and
specifically India joining US efforts to isolate and put sanctions against Iran
[Section 104g(2) E(i)]
·
Indian participation and formal declaration
of support for the US’ highly controversial Proliferation Security
Initiative including the illegal policy of interdiction of vessels in
international waters [Section 104g(2) K]
·
India conforming to various
bilateral/multilateral agreements to which India is not currently a signatory
such as the US’ Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group
etc [Section 104c E,F,G]
It
is on the basis of the Hyde Act that the United States has negotiated the
bilateral “123” agreement with India. Some
of the harmful provisions of the Hyde Act are reflected in the bilateral
agreement.
·
The bilateral agreement, while superficially
using the original wording of the joint statement of 2005, “full civilian
nuclear cooperation” actually denies cooperation or access in any form
whatsoever to fuel enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production
technologies. The statement of intent in the agreement that a suitable amendment
to enable this access may be considered in the future has little or no operative
value.
·
Further, this denial (made explicit in Art 5.2 of the agreement)
also extends to transfers of dual-use items that could be used in enrichment,
reprocessing or heavy water production facilities, again a stipulation of the
Hyde Act. Under these terms, a wide range of sanctions on a host of technologies
would continue, falling well short of “full civilian nuclear co-operation”.
·
It is also important to recognise that the fast breeder reactors
under this agreement would be treated as a part of the fuel cycle and any
technology required for this would also come under the dual use technology
sanctions. This would be true even if future fast breeder reactors were put in
the civilian sector and under safeguards. Thus, India’s attempt to build a
three-phase, self-reliant nuclear power program powered ultimately by thorium
would have to be developed under conditions of isolation and existing technology
sanctions.
·
Another key assurance that had been given by the Prime Minister
was that India would accept safeguards in perpetuity only in exchange for the
guarantee of uninterrupted fuel supply. While the acceptance on India’s part
of safeguards in perpetuity has been spelt out, the linkage of such safeguards
with fuel supply in perpetuity remains unclear.
The assurance that the United States would enable India to build a strategic fuel reserve to guard against disruption of supplies for a duration covering the lifetime of the nuclear reactors in operation appears to have been accepted in the agreement. However, whether the fuel supply will continue even after cessation or termination of the agreement depends solely on the US Congress. The Hyde Act explicitly states that the US will work with other Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) countries to stop all fuel and other supplies to India if the agreement is terminated under US laws. Since this agreement explicitly incorporates domestic laws, it appears that fuel supply from the US will not only cease in case the US decides to terminate the Agreement but they are also required under the Hyde Act to work with NSG to bar all future supplies. The clause 5.6 on disruption of supplies therefore seems to be limited to “market failures” and not to cover a disruption that takes place under the clauses of the Hyde Act. In such an eventuality, the US will have to pay compensation to India but all future fuel supplies would stop. Therefore, the 123 agreement represents the acceptance of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity for uncertain fuel supplies and continuing nuclear isolation with respect to a substantial amount of technological know-how.
The
Hyde Act and Supremacy of National Law
The
government has asserted that the Hyde Act is not binding on India.
The relevant issue is that it is binding on the United States and this
has been repeatedly stressed by US spokespersons.
Article
2 (1) of the 123 Agreement states, “The parties shall cooperate in the use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this
agreement. Each party shall implement this agreement in accordance with its
respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations, and license
requirements concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”.
If
the argument is that the reference to national laws is simply the case of
binding towards the law, that will have a bearing on the conduct of different
transactions under the 123 agreement, then what do we make of the
reference to national laws in other places in the 123 agreement?
Thus,
for instance, Article 5 (6) (a) in part states
that “As part of its implementation of the July 18, 2005, joint
statement the United States is committed to seeking agreement from the US
Congress to amend its domestic laws…to create the necessary conditions
for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market…..”.
Article 5(6) (b) (i) states that “The United States is willing to
incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in the bilateral US-India
agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Section 123 of the US
Atomic Energy Act, which would
be submitted to the US Congress”. These
clauses show that the need for conformity with “national laws” is not
superfluous. If there is no direct reference to the Hyde Act in the 123
agreement, it is simply because and this is worth reiterating that the Hyde Act
is the `Act to exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 a proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India.
Nuclear Power and Energy
Security
It
is said that the Indo-US nuclear deal is central to our future electricity and
energy requirements. At present, nuclear power generation capacity in India stands
at 4,120 MW which is a little less
than 3 per cent of our installed capacity of all power plants.
One reason has been the nuclear isolation imposed on us resulted in the
slow development of our civilian nuclear energy programme. However our
scientists overcoming many hurdles did very well in indigenising the Pressurised
Water Reactors, and then developing it further to 540 MW. The next stage is the
fast breeder reactors, in which the Indian scientists are leading the world. The
planned three stage nuclear programme would depend largely on technologies based
on fast breeder reactors, and in the future, thorium as fuel. This programme
requires far less uranium and lower dependence. Instead, the imported reactor
route would focus much more on Light Water Reactors, which require much more
uranium and are more expensive. Thus even the technology being offered will not
necessarily be the best choice for India. Significantly,
the mainstay of our nuclear power program – the fast breeder reactors – will
still be under technology sanctions, as they would be considered a part of the
fuel cycle.
The
other reason is the techno-economics of nuclear power and its relatively high
cost. Nuclear power plants are
about 50% per cent more expensive, even when using domestic technology and
equipment. If imported reactors for nuclear power are considered, the
situation becomes worse: it will cost about three times as much to set up
nuclear plants with imported reactors than coal based ones. It will also cost
twice as much per unit – Rs. 5.10-5.50 as against Rs. 2.50 from coal fired
plants.
According
to the Planning Commission’s study, the most optimistic scenario of nuclear
power is 15,000 MW by 2015 and 29,000 MW by 2021.
These targets includes 8,000 MW of imported reactors.
Even then, nuclear energy will only add up to about 7 per cent of our
total installed capacity.
Going
ahead with such an ambitious power programme dependant on imports will come at a
high cost and will dry up investments in other sectors. Interestingly enough,
nuclear power is not the energy of choice for most advanced countries. The US
itself has commissioned its last reactor in 1996! Members of Parliament may
recall the fiasco of Enron and its Dabhol power plants.
Implications for Foreign
Policy and Strategic Autonomy
The
United States does not see the nuclear cooperation agreement as a stand-alone.
It is part of American design to try in India a wide ranging strategic alliance
which will adversely affect the pursuit of an independent foreign policy and our
strategic autonomy. The facts speak
for themselves.
·
Two weeks prior to the joint statement which
announced the Indo-US nuclear cooperation agreement, India signed a ten-year
Defence Framework Agreement with the United States in June 2005.
This is being cited by the Bush administration as India’s commitment to
cooperate with the United States furthering its strategic interests in Asia.
·
Two months after the nuclear cooperation
agreement was announced in September 2005, India voted against Iran in the
International Atomic Energy Agency, contrary to its stance earlier that
Iran, as an NPT signatory, has every right to develop its nuclear technology for
civilian purposes.
·
This was followed by a second vote against Iran
in February on the eve of President Bush’s visit to India.
·
Nicholas Burns, US Under Secretary of State, in
his “On record briefing” after the finalisation of the 123 agreement said on
July 27: “And I think now that we have consummated the civil nuclear trade
between us, if we look down the road in the future, we’re going to see far
greater defence cooperation between the United State and India: training;
exercises; we hope, defence sales of American military technology to the Indian
armed forces.” The United States is exercising tremendous pressure on India
to buy a whole range of weaponry including the 126 fighter planes, radar,
helicopters, artillery etc. worth multi-billion dollars.
Is
the nuclear cooperation agreement going to bind India with the United States in
a relationship which goes contrary to our cherished goals of national
sovereignty and independent foreign policy and an economic development based on
the priorities of our people?
The
objections and the apprehensions raised by the Left parties and other parties,
organisations and concerned scientists and citizens need to be examined before
proceeding further. All we are
asking the government to do is not to rush through with the next steps which are
necessary to operationalise the deal.
We hope that you, as a Member of Parliament, which is the sovereign representative institution of the Indian people, will seriously consider these issues on this vital matter affecting our country’s future.
CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST)
