The
Marxist
Volume: 16, No. 01
Jan-March 2000
UNAFFORDABLE IS UNVIABLE:
The
Brown
out
of
the
New
Power
Policy
Vivek
Monteiro
The program to ‘reform’ the power sector in India has gone hand in hand with the broader structural adjustment programme for the economy and the ‘New Economic Policy’ of Liberalisation, Privatisation and Globalisation(LPG). In the 1991 Power Policy, the Government of India announced a wide range of policy measures to ‘liberalise’ the power sector in order to facilitate private and in particular, foreign investment. Basic legislation like the Indian Electricity Act 1910 and the Electricity Supply Act 1948 was amended. Foreign investors were allowed upto 100 % ownership of power projects. Tax holidays, reduction in import duties, and a slew of notifications from time to time were given in response to the demands of the foreign investors. For example in the crucial matter of determination of electricity tariff to be paid to a generating company, amending notifications were issued first in 1992, twice in 1994, twice in 1995 and four times in 1997. Fundamental new legislation for restructuring and ‘unbundling’ was also enacted in several states in response to World Bank dictates for structural changes in the power sector.
Many of the tariff notification amendments were made specifically to accommodate the Dabhol Power Project of Enron. (1) In fact the purpose of the project was not just to put up an expensive power plant which would earn hefty profits. It had a larger mission described by Linda Powers, Enron’s Vice President, Global Finance in her testimony before the Appropriations Subcommittee of the US Congress.(The $20 million educational expenses mentioned here has received wide publicity. The more important message however, largely missed by the media, is now becoming clear.) It is necessary to quote at length some excerpts from this testimony:
“Thanks
to
certain
changes
in
the
developing
countries
which
I
will
describe
in
a
minute,
a
new
way
of
achieving
the
same
development
goals
has
become
possible.
Private
parties
like
our
company
and
others,
are
now
able
to
develop,
construct,
own
and
operate,
private
infrastructure
projects
in
these
countries.
In
the
process
of
doing
so,
private
parties
are
able
to
achieve
the
two
things
which
U.S.
foreign
assistance
efforts
have
long
been
trying
(without
much
success)
to
achieve
:
(1)
the
projects
are
serving
as
action
forcing
events
that
are
getting
the
host
countries
to
finally
implement
the
legal
and
policy
changes
long
urged
upon
them….
Under
this
new
approach,
the
private
parties
are
bearing
the
costs,
both
for
bringing
the
policy
reform
process
to
fruition,
with
the
host
country
governments,
and
for
the
facilities
to
alleviate
current
problems….
This
private
sector
driven
approach
I
am
describing
applies
not
only
in
the
energy
sector,
which
is
my
company’s
area
of
activity,
but
also
in
other
infrastructure
sectors—toll
roads
and
other
transport
facilities;
water
and
sewage;
telecom—and
potentially
in
industrial
sectors….
When
a
firm
like
Enron,
Mission
or
AES
goes
into
a
foreign
country
to
undertake
a
project,
just
what
do
we
do
?…
We
make
money
by
selling
an
important
commodity—electricity—to
the
local
people
at
a
reasonable
price.
If
we
are
successful,
the
results
are
not
only
the
addition
of
valuable
assets
to
the
country,
but
equally
important,
the
creation
of
“commercial
infrastructure”.
These
projects
must
be
put
together
and
financed
using
standard
private
sector
tools.
This
process,
which
for
the
first
round
of
projects
is
invariably
painful
and
time
consuming,
forces
government
officials
of
the
country
in
question
to
deal
with
the
reforms
needed
in
these
key
areas
:
1.Property
rights
,
including
the
enforceability
of
contracts….
2.Market
Pricing…..
One
of
the
biggest
problems
in
these
countries
is
that
they
have
all
had
hugely
subsidized
infrastructure
services…Projects
like
ours
aren’t
financeable
as
long
as
you
have
artificially
depressed
prices.
So
they
have
to
bring
the
prices
in
alignment
with
market
pricing.
3.
Regulatory
reform.
One
of
the
most
important
regulatory
reforms—privatization—is
by
definition,
the
necessary
starting
point
for
any
of
these
private
infrastructure
projects…
4.
Sound
lending…
These
are
the
kinds
of
important
changes
in
laws,policies
and
practices
that
private
sector
led
infrastructure
projects
are
causing
to
finally
be
implemented.
By
working
closely
with
private
developers,
engineers,
financial
advisors,
lawyers
and
lenders
throughout
the
several
year
process
of
project
development
and
financing,
host
country
authorities
come
to
realise
that
the
project
can
only
go
forward
to
fruition
if
these
changes
are
made.
Importantly,
the
project
also
provides
these
authorities
with
some
“cover”
against
domestic
criticism
and
resistance
to
these
changes.
Let
me
give
you
a
real
world
example
to
illustrate
these
points.
Just
yesterday
Enron
reached
closing
on
a
$920
million
power
plant
project
in
Dabhol…This
is
the
first
privately
developed
independent
power
plant
in
India…
Working
through
this
process
has
given
the
Indian
authorities
a
real
and
concrete
understanding
of
the
kinds
of
legal
and
policy
changes
needed
in
India,
and
has
given
the
Indian
banks
a
real
and
concrete
understanding
of
sound
project
lending
practices.
Moreover,
our
company
spent
an
enormous
amount
of
its
own
money—approximately
$20
million—on
this
education
and
project
development
process
alone,
not
including
any
project
costs…
Furthermore,
the
education
provided
by
our
project
has
had
a
greater
impact
than
would
further
general
technical
assistance,
and
has
finally
achieved
some
key
changes
that
have
long
been
urged
by
development
institutions
such
as
the
World
Bank
and
AID.
Just
two
of
a
number
of
examples:
·
The
State
of
Maharashtra,
where
our
project
is
located
in
India,
is
now
revamping
its
electricity
rate
structure
to
end
electricity
price
subsidies.
·
Five
leading
Indian
banks
are
playing
a
major
role
in
the
total
financing
package
for
our
power
plant
project….
The
success
of
these
private
projects
in
achieving
the
third
key—benefitting
U.S.
interests—should
already
be
obvious
from
my
description
of
the
projects,
and
I
will
touch
on
it
only
briefly.
One
of
the
main(though
not
the
only
)
benefits
to
U.S.
interests
lies
in
the
economic
value
of
these
infrastructure
projects.
They
are
very
large,
usually
ranging
from
about
$
200-700
million
per
project.
They
include
correspondingly
large
amounts
of
capital
equipment,
and
engineering
and
other
high
value-added
services.
Since
much
of
these
goods
and
services
can
be
sourced
in
the
U.S.,
these
infrastructure
projects
are
the
most
important
area
of
growth
in
export
value
to
the
U.S..
In
fact,
they
are
already
catching
up
to
aircraft
in
export
importance,
and
should
surpass
aircraft
during
this
decade.”
Legal and policy changes to facilitate privatization, and what Ms. Powers calls ‘market pricing’ is what the new power policy is all about. One decade down the line this policy is not only in deep crisis, it is in shambles, a fiasco ,wherever it has been implemented, beginning with Maharashtra, home of the Dabhol Power Project.
The term “financial closure” of power projects is set to acquire a completely different meaning in Maharashtra- shutdown of power plants due to payment problems. These are the hard implications of recently disclosed facts . In December 1999, the Maharashtra State Electricity Board had submitted a proposal for tariff revision before the newly constituted Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission(MERC). Several organisations appearing before the MERC including the Maharashtra State Committee of the Centre of Indian Trade Unions pointed out inconsistencies and challenged the data provided, which led to the MERC directing the MSEB to make a fresh proposal based on realistic figures. MSEB submitted its revised proposal in March 2000. The new data provided has shocking implications.
Consider the following figures for power purchase. In the current financial year MSEB will purchase 16.435 billion units of energy at a cost of Rs 3798 crores. Out of this 4.2 billion units purchased from the Dabhol Power Company will cost Rs 1998 crores. The balance 12.235 billion units from all other sources will cost Rs 1800 crores.
The cost of DPC power at generation is an astounding Rs 4.76 per unit which works out to a cost of supply of Rs 6.53 per unit after factoring in 27 % T&D losses. The same amount of energy from alternate sources would not cost more than Rs 750 crores. There is a remarkable perspective on the excess payment of around Rs 1250 crores per annum.
The MSEB proposal discloses that capacity payments to DPC are around Rs 85 crores per month. Variable energy cost is around Rs 2.79 per unit. Experts have submitted to the MERC that even if MSEB pays over Rs 1000 crores capacity charges per year to DPC as per the power purchase agreement to keep the plant shut while drawing power from alternate sources, it will still save money.
It is clear that the entry into commercial service of Phase I of the DPC has presented MSEB with an insurmountable problem. In 1996-97 the average cost of supply for MSEB was Rs 2.03per unit. In 1997-98 it went up to Rs 2.14 per unit. For 1998-99 it was 2.26 which was expected to increase to Rs 2.50 in 1999-2000. With DPC coming onstream in May 1999, the average cost of supply for 1999-2000 shot to Rs 2.90 per unit.
In 1998, the Rajadhyaksha Committee Report on MSEB had anticipated a crunch : “The next question which needs urgent attention pertains to the rationalisation of the entire tariff structure. This has assumed a new urgency in view of the several IPPs already approved by the state government and those which are under consideration of the government. The available data in terms of such sanctioned projects show that the share of the purchased power in the total power supply by MSEB is expected to go up each year. This will have significant implications for the pooled cost of generation of MSEB.
Based
on
certain
assumptions
the
cost
of
MSEB’s
pooled
power
is
estimated
to
go
up
from
about
Rs.
1.90
per
unit
in
1995-96
to
Rs.
2.86
PU
(best
scenario)
and
Rs.
3.72
PU
(worst
scenario)
in
2001-2002.
The
MSEB,
at
the
instance
of
the
state
government,
has
followed
the
policy
of
loading
a
major
portion
of
the
increase
in
tariff
primarily
on
HT
industry,
commercial
users,
bulk
supplies,
inter
state
sales
and
railway
traction
supply.
For
various
reasons,
such
steep
increases
in
the
rates
to
these
consumers
will
neither
be
sustainable
nor
feasible
in
the
future.”
That time of reckoning is already upon Maharashtra. New capacity additions in generation were predicated on the assumption of a healthy growth rate for industry which could shoulder the burden of increased costs. That assumption has collapsed. In reality there has been a drop in high tension industrial consumption for the second year in succession. So who will pay the increased bill ?
The MERC can approve higher tariffs for different classes of consumers. But it cannot ensure that they will be realised. Studies have shown that there are many classes of consumers who default not because they won’t pay, but because they cannot.The following scenario is not unlikely : Further tariff increases may not result in the expected revenue increase. They may only expand the nonperforming sector for MSEB. MSEB then has the option of cutting off supplies to defaulting consumers, which would result in further contraction of aggregate demand, in the face of increasing supplies of high cost power. This will so sharply accelarate the increase in the average cost of supply that the Rajadhyaksha Committee ‘worst case’ scenario may in fact turn out an underestimate.
These imperatives must have weighed on the MERC. In a recent order,(April2000) it has given a number of significant directions - strict merit order purchase, including non-purchase from DPC during off peak hours; 6.5 % increase in average tariff, far less than the 20% demanded by MSEB, strict audit accounting, reduction in bulk tariff for HT consumers, along with a controversial tariff hike for lowest class of urban consumers.
Unless there is an immediate reduction in T&D losses, which is unlikely,the MERC tariff order will have predictable consequences: payments default by MSEB. With only Rs 630 crores out of the Rs 2000 crore deficit in 1999-2000 taken care of that problem is already in its lap. Payment default by MSEB to its suppliers may not immediately lead to shutting off supplies, but with the free power option rapidly shrinking all around, that prospect is not distant.
Clauses in the DPC-MSEB PPA ensure that DPC gets paid first, come what may. The Enron-DPC project already has something like 26 escrow covers to take care of its dues. When supplies shrink to match revenue possibilities, the absurd outcome is that the addition of each unit of Enron power will lead to the subtraction of three units of cheaper power which cannot be paid for. The DPC project would not add to but in fact decrease the de facto aggregate electric energy available to Maharashtra.
This is the problem with only Phase I of the DPC project which is one third of the planned capacity. Phase II will take the payment burden to a likely Rs. 7000 crores a year. However, Maharashtra will face the payments fiasco well before Phase II comes onstream. A fundamental reconsideration of high cost power projects has become unavoidable. Damage limitation is the only real option open to Maharashtra today - choosing which power plants it will run and which plants it will have to turn off on financial considerations.
An unsustainable payments crisis has also been the outcome of the Orissa experiment(2). The Orissa experiment is important because it has been universally projected as the advance guard of the electricity ‘reforms’ process, which is to be implemented in other states. All the steps of the restructuring paradigm have been dutifully implemented in Orissa : the enactment of the Orissa Electricity Reform Act, 1995, the ‘unbundling’ of the Orissa State Electricity Board into separate entities for generation, transmission and distribution, the corporatisation, commercialisation and privatisation of the distribution entities and the creation of a statutory authority, namely the Orissa Electricity Regulatory Authority to oversee the operations and set transmission and distribution tariffs.
A high level committee under the Chairmanship of Pradeep Baijal constituted by the Ministry of Power to formulate a rescue package has arrived at the following conclusions regarding the multiple payments defaults which characterise the crisis:
The
salient
features
of
the
crisis
are
the
following:
a.
The
payables
of
Gridco
(transmission
entity)
are
expected
to
be
Rs
1160
crores
at
the
end
of
FY
00.
Included
in
this
is
a
cash
deficitt
amounting
to
Rs
860.67
crores
which
has
been
projected
for
FY
99
and
FY
00.
b.
This
reflects
the
weakest
link
in
the
generation-transmission-distribution
chain
in
the
state
and
could
derail
the
reform
process
since
the
payment
inability
of
Gridco
would
determine
the
commercial
viability
of
the
privatised
distribution
companies
as
well
as
the
part
privatised
generation
companies.
c.
The
financial
position
of
Gridco
has
impacted
on
the
Central
Public
Sector
Undertakings
dealing
with
the
state.
The
estimated
outstanding
liabilities
of
Gridco
and
the
receivables
as
of
March
31,
2000
are
indicated
below
:
Gridco
owes
:
a.
Rs
1160.4
crores
on
account
of
the
power
purchased
by
it
from
the
Central
and
other
state
generating
stations
b.
The
financial
institutions,
public
and
World
Bank
an
amount
of
Rs
2714.5
crores
by
way
of
loans.
Gridco
is
owed
:
a.
An
amount
of
Rs
1003.1
crores
from
the
government
departments,PSUs
and
distribution
companies.
The situation is aggravated since the state government has strained its ability to alleviate the financial problems of Gridco. Hence it has sought the Centre’s financial intervention in this matter.
The
Committee
is
of
the
view
that
the
viability
of
the
reform
process
is
crucial
not
only
from
the
point
of
view
of
the
Orissa
state’s
power
sector
but
also
the
overall
reform
climate
in
the
country.
The
absence
of
a
demonstration
effect
from
the
first
reform
experiment
in
Orissa
can
severely
impede
future
reforms
in
other
states.
Hence
all
measures
must
be
taken
to
ensure
that
the
transition
period
during
the
Orissa
reforms
is
trouble
free….
….This
is
because
although
the
reform
process
in
the
states
are
conducted
on
a
bilateral
basis
with
the
multilateral
institutions,
a
financial
crisis
arising
out
of
such
an
exercise
cannot
be
ignored
by
the
Centre.
The
spinoff
effects
of
the
reform
process
cannot
be
in
a
retrograde
direction,
else
the
current
World
Bank
funded
reform
prescriptions
in
the
states
of
Andhra
Pradesh,
Uttar
Pradesh,
Rajasthan,
Haryana
and
Karnataka
would
be
severely
stifled.
The Baijal Committee report also analyses why the “meltdown” in Orissa has occurred :
It acknowledges that T&D losses have been much higher than presumed. The expected increase in industrial consumption has not occurred, on the contrary there has been a “depressed demand” from industry due to prolonged industrial recession and “steady flight to captive generation”. The privatised distribution companies have been unable to collect and unable to pay. The result : a growing gap between the realisation per unit of energy supplied and the average cost of supply.
There is no Enron in Orissa burdening the state with compulsory purchase of exorbitant power at over Rs 6.50 average cost of supply per unit. But privatisation with its attendant financial jugglery of “upvaluation of assets”, high debts and consequent interest burdens,’adequate’ return on equity, allowable depreciation etc. have nevertheless led to a quadrupling of the power purchase bill for Gridco. This too has contributed to the crisis, though this is not identified as a cause by the Baijal committee.
Essentially similar conclusions have been arrived at in respect of power reforms in Karnataka. The government of Karnataka set up a high level committee under the Chairmanship of Deepak Parekh, Chairman of the Infrastructure Development Corporation to make an assessment of the escrow potential of the state.The terms of reference included :
I
To
scrutinise
the
escrow
capacity
of
the
Karnataka
Electricity
Board(now
reconstituted
as
the
Karnataka
Power
Transmission
Corporation
Ltd.)
as
assessed
in
various
studies,
and
advise
the
government
on
the
existing
and
likely
escrow
capacity;
II
In
relation
to
the
various
Power
Purchase
agreements
and
approvals
given
to
power
projects
by
IPPs
in
the
State,
to
advise
government
on
the
principles
to
be
adopted
in
allocating
the
available
escrow
capacity.
The Parekh committee submitted its report in February 2000. Its conclusions, while remarkable, are not surprising in the light of existing realities:
In
the
opinion
of
the
Committee,
the
central
problem
of
the
power
sector
in
Karnataka
is
the
inadequacy
of
cash
flows
from
the
sale
of
power.
This
inadequacy
of
cash
flows
stems
from
two
reasons,
viz,
technical
and
non-technical
losses
within
the
system
and
imbalances
and
inadequacies
in
the
tariff
structure.
The
calculation
of
escrow
capacity
presented
before
the
Committee
is
based
on
assumptions
that
losses
will
reduce
drastically,
tariffs
will
increase
significantly
every
year,
agricultural
consumers
will
pay
substantially
more
than
they
do
today,
and
the
Government
will
pay
large
subsidies
Going
by
past
experience,
the
Committee
considers
such
assumptions
unrealistc.
But
hard
decisions
will
now
have
to
be
taken
(emphasis
in
original)
The
Committee
notes
that
the
GoK
has
embarked
on
a
power
sector
reform
programme,
whose
impact
will
take
time
to
be
felt.
The
assumption
that
existing
revenue
sources
can
support
new
capacity,
while
future
growth
in
revenue
will
meet
existing
commitments,
is
not
supportable,
in
the
light
of
the
decline
in
grid
demand
from
Industrial
HT
users
and
the
growth
in
demand
from
Irrigation
and
the
lack
of
any
effective
action
to
reverse
this
trend.
Even
if
tariffs
are
rebalanced,
and
this
now
depends
largely
on
the
State
Electricity
Regulatory
Commission,
the
reduction
in
Industrial
HT
prices
required
to
attract
them
back
to
the
grid
would
require
a
concomitantly
larger
increase
in
irrigation
tariffs
or
alternatively
increased
support
from
GoK,
which
does
not
appear
to
be
forthcoming.
Substantial
revenue
increases
are
thus
not
foreseen
in
the
medium
term
without
increases
in
irrigation
tariffs
and
reduction
in
T&D
losses.
The
consideration
of
the
financial
situation
of
KPTCL,
its
operational
efficiency,
the
possibility
of
tariff
rebalancing
and
the
state
of
GoK
finances
has
led
the
Committee
to
the
assessment
that
as
long
as
the
present
situation
continues,
it
is
close
to
impossible
to
structure
any
kind
of
payment
security
mechanism
for
IPPs
.
The
fiscal
position
of
the
GoK
makes
it
unlikely
that
financial
commitments
by
KPTCL
to
purchase
energy
from
IPPs
or
other
sources,
if
they
are
entered
into,
can
be
honoured.
In
the
present
situation,
there
is,
in
sum,
no
escrow
capacity
in
Karnataka
for
the
purchase
of
new
power.
The
Committee
has
been
advised
that
the
erstwhile
Karnataka
Electricity
Board
has
executed
bilateral
escrow
agreements
with
the
three
projects
which
total
351
MW.
The
Committee
has
noted
that
these
agreements
are
not
tripartite
agreements
and
do
not
have
the
signature
of
an
identified
Escrow
Agent.
In
light
of
the
determination
that
there
is
no
escrowable
capacity
at
this
stage,
the
Committee
is
of
the
opinion
that
GoK
should
not
proceed
any
further
with
regard
to
the
escrow
agreements
with
these
projects.
The
Karnataka
report
makes
a
number
of
observations
which
have
wider
implications
:
In
theory,
the
sale
of
extra
energy
pumped
into
the
system
by
the
new
project
is
supposed
to
generate
the
revenue
to
allow
such
segregation
without
reduction
in
expenditure
on
some
other
item.
In
practice,
as
is
seen
from
the
experience
in
Karnataka
in
the
recent
past
(when
1068
MU
was
pumped
into
the
system
but
only
169
MU
could
be
metered
and
billed),
the
sale
of
the
extra
energy
does
not
usually
generate
sufficient
revenue
to
pay
for
itself.
In
such
cases,
the
establishment
of
an
escrow
account
would
necessarily
imply
a
reduction
in
expenditure
on
another
account.
The
current
practice
is
to
identify
specific
revenue
collection
centres
and
arrange
for
the
collections
from
these
centres
to
be
deposited
into
a
separate
account
in
an
identified
bank
i.e.
the
Escrow
Agent.
An
escrow
therefore
transfers
the
primary
claim
on
revenue
stream
from
the
Distribution
Company
to
the
IPP.
In
the
context
of
privatisation
of
distribution
zones,
most
of
the
privatised
regions
can
be
expected
to
have
cash
losses
in
the
initial
years.
The
negative
effect
of
an
escrow
on
the
already
low
cash
flow
stream
that
would
be
received
by
the
prospective
buyer
makes
it
difficult
to
privatise
a
region
that
has
been
escrowed.
Escrowing
of
specific
zones
thereby
hinders
the
process
of
distribution
privatisation.
What has happened in Orissa is pertinent in this context. An IPP, AES, has become principal shareholder in CESCO, a distribution company, with an escrow account for power supplied by the OPGC generating company, in which AES has controlling share. This kind of rebundling of unbundled entities is now seen as permissible and acceptable, provided the entities are privately owned. Unbundling of vertically integrated SEBs , in the name of encouraging competition and preventing vested interest, is evidently a temporary phenomenon, a transition measure. There are no proposals to unbundle the privately owned, vertically integrated Tata Electric Company and the BSES. This is also relevant in the context of Enron and the privatisation of distribution in Maharashtra.
The payments crises in Maharashtra, Orissa and Karnataka, though different in details have much in common. The situation in Madhya Pradesh, Delhi or Haryana has also the same or similar script. Each tells a story of failure of power markets in the specific circumstances of each state.
At the commencement of the New Power Policy it was assumed that since electricity was such an essential commodity, power markets could never fail. No matter what the price, consumers would buy. Catchwords replaced rationality. The prevailing wisdom was “No power is more expensive than no power”. Anybody who suggested otherwise was described as an ideologue, and ignored in the supreme confidence that there was money to be made and the only real question was who would get what share. In any case the pond was so big and deep that everybody’s thirst could be satisfied provided that nobody was allowed to rock the boat. Many of the initial players are now left high and dry by the ensuing payments fiasco. But ‘reform’ is far from being abandoned . The Central Government and World Bank are desperately putting in place new financial packages to rescue the privatised interests which involve subsidies far bigger than the SEBs ever required. Comprehensive legislative change is being planned with the Electricity Bill 2000 on the cards for enactment (3).
There are some inescapable conclusions which can be drawn from the power market failure which is characteristic of the unaffordable electricity paradigm of the reformers :
1.
The
reformers’
perception
of
‘reasonable’
market
pricing
is
not
only
unreasonable
in
the
Indian
context,
it
is
unviable
and
unsustainable.
2.
Electricity
is
not
an
elite
consumption
good
(ECG),
nor
is
it
politically
feasible
to
convert
it
into
an
ECG
after
40
years
of
preliberalisation
policies
which
succeeded
in
reaching
electricity
to
a
substantial
proportion
of
the
common
people.
Therefore
there
will
always
be
powerful
public
pressure
for
affordable
electricity
and
a
power
policy
for
delivering
the
same.
3.
Affordable
electricity
requires
a
number
of
simultaneous
conditions
:
least
cost
generation,
along
with
a
compatible
fuel
policy,
least
cost
merit
order
despatch,
strict
audit
accounting
at
all
levels
to
eliminate
waste
and
theft,
demand
side
management
of
electricity
consumption,
carefully
worked
out
subsidies,
particularly
for
some
categories
of
agriculture
consumers,
through
cross-subsidization
or
otherwise.
Tariff
issues
must
be
addressed
,
worked
out
and
public
consensus
built
on
this
understanding.
This
is
a
political
exercise.
4.
The
current
power
policy
is
fatally
flawed
and
will
soon
collapse
due
to
unresolvable
payments
crisis.
Alternate
power
policy
will
soon
be
seen
as
necessary.
This
should
become
part
of
the
alternate
left
and
democratic
political
/economic
agenda
for
the
nation.
5.
Though
the
current
power
policy
is
failing
it
is
far
from
being
abandoned.
The
immediate
task
is
to
contain
and
prevent
irreversible
long
term
damage
to
the
nation’s
electricity
infrastructure.
Long
term
PPAs,
Fuel
Import
Policy,
the
proposed
new
electricity
legislation
are
some
immediate
issues.
6.
The
trade
union
movement,
particularly
the
electricity
workers
unions
and
technical
officers
associations
will
have
to
play
a
leading
role
in
the
alternate
power
policy.
They
have
high
stakes
in
the
outcome.
The
technical,
organisational
and
managerial
capabilities
are
also
available
with
the
concerned
organisations.
The
trade
union
movement
will
have
to
gear
up
and
orient
itself
to
addressing
the
various
problems
thrown
up
by
this
agenda.It
will
have
to
be
proactive
and
take
initiative
on
issues
pertaining
to
viability,
cost
efficiency,
effective
auditing
and
control
of
theft
and
corruption.
The new Economic Policy of the nineties has failed in many ways. It failed to reduce poverty , to generate employment or to raise the living standards of the common citizens. This kind of failure however did not threaten the continuance of certain aspects of the policy like import intensive consumerism. The failure of the second phase of the NEP- import intensive infrastructure development is of a different kind. Not only is it more comprehensive , it has become visible. The alarm bells are ringing in officialdom.Even its supporters are forced to realise that the new power policy is unviable and unsustainable. Because electricity is an essential commodity, unaffordable is unviable.
The next question that arises is : Is affordable viable ? Though a full discussion of this question is beyond the scope of this article, the preceding analysis indicates that such an alternate power policy is both necessary and possible. The working out and implementation of this affordable and viable power policy will be critical for the future of this country. It is an important and urgent task before the left and democratic forces in the country today.
Acknowledgements
In studying and understanding the subjects dealt with in this article I have benefitted greatly from discussions with, writings by and material provided by the following friends and colleagues : P.P.Sanzgiri, S.R. Paranjpe, Sudha Mahalingam of Frontline,Probir Purkayastha, Ashok Rao and the National Working Group on Power Sector, Sunip Sen, Abhay Mehta, Girish Sant, Sulabha Brahme, Prashant Bhushan, Pradyumna Kaul, Baburao Samant, Harry Dhaul. There are individuals in government to whom I am indebted but cannot name for obvious reasons. The responsibility for any shortcomings in the data and analysis is the author’s alone.
Notes
1.
In
a
writ
petition
filed
by
P.P.Sanzgiri,
President
of
the
Maharashtra
State
Committee
of
Centre
of
Indian
Trade
Unions
and
Abhay
Mehta,
energy
analyst
in
the
Mumbai
High
Copurt
against
the
Enron
project,
several
secret
documents
were
filed
which
detail
exactly
how
the
tariff
notifications
were
amended
to
suit
Enron’s
requirements.
These
documents
are
excerpted
in
Abhay
Mehta’s
recent
book
“Power
Play”.(Orient
Longman,2000)
2. A detailed discussion is contained in Frontline, March 17, 2000 “Power Reforms in Trouble”, Sudha Mahalingam.
3. See for instance “Electricity Bill 2000” ,National Working Group on Power Sector (April 2000)