The
Marxist
Volume: 17, No. 02
April-June 2001
(Adopted
by
the
West
Bengal
State
Committee
of
the
CPI(M))
in
its
Meeting
Held
on
June
30-July
01,
2001)
Thirteenth Assembly Elections Posed
The
Toughest
of
Challenges
Before
Us
1.1
Given
the
background
of
the
setbacks
to
socialism,
the
imperialist
offensive
in
the
quest
for
a
unipolar
world,
the
rise
of
reactionary
and
communal
forces
within
the
country,
and
the
persistent
weakness
of
the
Left
and
democratic
forces
the
nationwide,
the
spread
of
negative
outlook
amongst
the
people
towards
the
24
years
of
unbroken
existence
of
the
Left
Front
government
was
quite
natural.
A
majority
of
voters
were
in
the
age
group
of
18-40
years.
They
do
not
possess
any
memories
of
political
experience
about
any
other
government.
The
memories
of
the
older
generation
had
already
started
to
fade.
Despite
the
class-based
and
welfare-oriented
success
of
the
working
of
the
Left
Front,
the
reflection
of
the
countrywide
economic
situation
certainly
cast
its
shadow
in
our
state
as
well.
The
problem
of
unemployment
has
gone
on
to
become
more
acute.
This
has
created
a
feeling
of
frustration
and
restlessness
among
the
youth.
The
inevitable
commercialization
of
services
like
education,
health
etc,
in
the
backdrop
of
increasing
disparities
has
created
a
feeling
of
natural
discontent
among
the
poorer
sections
of
the
people.
The
ruling
classes
did
their
best
to
ensure
that
the
blame
for
the
social-economic
system
of
India
and
the
baneful
policies
they
pursue
fall
on
to
the
shoulders
of
the
Left
Front
government.
Unless
the
level
of
political
consciousness
of
the
people
is
heightened
about
the
entirety
of
the
socio-economic
system
and
about
Center-state
relations,
it
becomes
difficult
to
resist
and
contain
such
developments.
An
attempt
was
also
made
to
transfer
onto
the
Left
Front
government
the
blame
for
the
negative
attitude
of
the
Union
government
about
putting
a
stop
to
riverbank
erosion
and
preventive
measures
against
floods.
Various
reasons
have
led
to
the
inadequacy
of
power
supply
in
the
villages
as
against
the
demand
generated
and
this
has
caused
discontent
to
grow
to
some
extent.
The
opposition
also
used
against
us
administrative
lapses
which
led
to
the
problem
of
non-availability
of
ration
cards.
1.2
The
ruling
classes
began
resort
to
armed
assaults
against
us
after
the
realization
that
the
Left
Front
cannot
be
defeated
through
political
struggle.
For
this
reason
the
ruling
classes
focused
on
the
Trinamul
Congress
from
the
time
it
was
born
as
the
alternative
to
the
Left
Front.
The
murder
of
our
workers
in
covert
attacks
has
been
going
on
for
the
past
two
decades
and
during
the
tenure
of
the
Left
Front
government,
more
than
3500
workers
of
our
Party
have
been
murdered.
In
the
wake
of
the
Panchayat
polls
of
1998,
the
attacks
against
our
party
under
the
leadership
of
the
Trinamul
congress
took
a
serious
and
violent
turn.
The
BJP,
and
in
some
instances
the
Congress
became
a
party
to
these
attacks
against
us.
A
situation
where
attacks
by
“storm
troopers”
comprising
goondas,
dacoits
and
professional,
anti-socials
that
were
carefully
organised
in
armed
groups.
The
flow
of
arms
started
from
the
jotdars
and
zamindars
who
found
themselves
cornered
by
the
policies
of
the
Left
Front
government.
Choosing
a
few
police
station
areas
at
a
point
where
the
borders
of
the
districts
of
Midnapore,
Bankura
and
Hooghly
converge,
they
were
declared
as
having
been
“liberated.”
In
a
matter
of
a
few
months,
more
than
a
hundred
Party
workers
were
murdered,
four
thousand
houses
were
torched,
more
than
three
thousand
households
looted,
and
crores
of
rupees
extracted
as
“fines.”
To
spread
this
line
of
attack
elsewhere,
attempt
was
made
to
create
terror
in
other
districts
as
well.
The
BJP-Trinamul
combine
inducted
a
handful
of
retired
IAS-IPS
officers
in
their
ranks
and
tried
to
influence
the
police
and
the
general
administration
in
their
favour.
US
imperialism
has
attempted
to
try
and
finish
off
the
Left
in
the
past.
They
attempted
a
“probe”
into
the
Nanur
incident
transgressing
all
diplomatic
norms.
After
the
staunch
protest
launched
by
the
state
government,
the
US
ambassador
was
forced
to
apologise
to
the
Union
government
for
the
incident.
The
Trinamul-BJP
combine
continued
to
try
and
exonerate
US
imperialism
from
all
charges
in
this
regard.
Everybody
now
knows
the
real
intent
of
the
arms-drop
made
in
Purulia
some
years
back.
The
Trinamul-BJP
alliance
also
kept
on
demanding
clamping
of
Article
356
on
West
Bengal
or
at
least
to
declare
it
a
disturbed
area.
A
series
of
Union
government’s
“fact
finding”
teams
were
sent
to
West
Bengal
although
could
not
succeed
in
their
devious
game.
The
election
campaign
started
with
indecent
and
slanderous
language
and
gestures
and
threats
about
finishing
us
off
though
armed
attacks.
The
aim
was
to
make
the
elections
a
farce
and
to
create
fear,
anxiety,
hopelessness
among
both
the
people
and
our
workers.
To
make
their
activists
desperated,
the
slogan
“now
or
never”
was
raised.
The
process
of
murdering
or
workers
and
leaders
was
continued
in
the
run
up
to
and
during
the
polls.
They
first
struck
an
alliance
with
the
Kamatapuris
and
raised
the
slogan
of
terror
and
murder:
“Kamta
to
the
north,
Mamata
to
the
south.”
Despite
the
breakdwon
of
understanding,
the
Trinamul
kept
supporting
and
aiding
the
politics
of
murder
of
the
Kamtapuris.
1.3
The
bulk
of
the
media
has
long
been
fiercely
against
us.
The
role
of
a
few
mass-circulated
newspapers
and
TV
channels
has
been
alarming
during
the
Assembly
polls.
They
went
ahead
to
fix
the
line
of
campaign
of
the
opposition
here.
Their
activates
included:
falsification
and
“creation”
of
news,
publishing
organised
photo-shoots,
suppression
of
news
that
would
favour
the
Left
Front,
spreading
the
canard
that
West
Bengal
under
Left
Front
has
deteriorated
into
a
hell
compared
to
the
rest
of
the
country,
assisting
the
creation
of
terror
directly,
identifying
the
terror
created
by
the
Trinamul
Congress
as
“people
wrath”
and
dubbing
all
resistance
as
“goondaism”
on
our
part.
They
would
describe
the
inhuman,
fascistic,
aggressive
and
violent
leadership
of
the
Trinamul
Congress
as
honest,
self-sacrificing,
imbued
with
childlike
simplicity,
pro-poor
and
even
as
it
heaven-born
and
run
appropriate
stories
to
prove
this.
The
inevitability
of
the
defeat
of
the
Left
Front
was
carried
out
via
various
opinion
polls
and
surveys.
The
TV
programmes
allegedly
aired
to
debate
various
issues
were
actually
aimed
at
creating
opinion
against
us.
The
mass
media
tried
to
whip
up
a
storm
about
“change
everything”
against
us
and
hoped
us
and
hoped
that
the
Party
and
the
Left
Party
and
the
Left
Front
get
blown
away
by
that
storm.
One
mass
circulated
publication
gave
out
the
slogan
in
their
publicity
hoardings
of
“turn
over
and
see
how
everything
has
changed.”
A
new
definition
of
democracy
was
heralded
as
changing
government
and
that
without
change
there
can
be
no
democracy.
They
had
no
doubt
that
the
Trinamul
supremo
was
to
become
the
new
chief
minister.
It
needs
a
separated
booklet
to
detail
out
the
vicious
role
of
the
media.
We
cannot
claim
that
we
could
totally
negate
all
the
facts
of
the
campaign
against
us.
Still,
the
victory
assumes
importance
in
view
of
the
united
campaign
conducted
by
the
forces
of
reaction.
1.4 On the plea of political debate, some comrades kept alive factionalism. Their ambit of influence and activities became smaller following the unified programme adopted at the Special Party Congress. However, their factionalism started to get a planned organised shape. The state committee countered the situation with patience, self-control and firmness by drawing a line between the anti-party workers and those who were merely misled and set to remove all confusion. A former member of the Party’s central committee first quit the Party and the former secretary of the south 24 Parganas district unit of the Party and a few district committee members of some other districts set up a new Party. The media did its best to give them importance and blow them out of all proportion.
2.1 In this background, from the month of January this year, we started to activise the Party for the election campaign. The list of Left Front and CPI(M) candidates could be published by the end of February, more than two months before the polls.
2.2
The
main
planks
of
the
political
campaign
were
:
· The effect of the policy of liberalisation of the union government on industry, agriculture, services, unemployment etc and the responsibility of the Trinamul, the BJP and the Congress as in the government at the Central level.
· The efforts and the successes of the pro-people policies of the Left Front government in this backdrop and the limitations of the state government.
· The character of terrorist authoritarianism and the dangers it poses for the democratic rights of the people.
· The danger of communal and divisive forces in the backdrop of the gravity of class attack and the need for class cohesion. The danger imminent in the call given for a virtual re-partitioning of Bengal through an alliance with divisive forces in the name of a “Bangla Bachao Front.”
· The terible role played by the media to throttle the truth.
2.3 Five booklets were published from the state center along with the manifesto of the Left Front. In carrying through the basic campaign matter and in the supply of facts, the roe of Ganashakti and other Party publications remained important. The process was aided by the decision to publish a sliguri edition of the Ganashakti and the number of copies of Ganashakti in circulation went up. In view of the alliance formed between the Trinamul and the Congress by the middle of April, an “Appeal” by the Left Front was published. Various other campaign materials were published by the mass organisations and by the district committees.
2.4
Aiming
at
creation
of
a
feeling
that
was
positive
about
a
win
by
the
Left
Front
and
about
the
electoral
support
of
the
Left
front
towards
that
victory,
intensive
campaign
was
carried
out
through
smaller
area-wise
meetings
in
the
urban
and
rural
areas,
contact
was
maintained
with
each
voter,
and
coming
face-to-face
with
the
people,
and
this
was
done
without
ignoring
the
importance
of
large
central
rallies.
2.5
The
workers’
meetings,
central
and
local
were
carried
out
at
every
level
between
January
and
March
of
2001.
With
restriction
on
the
public
address
systems
being
used
before
April
12
because
of
the
secondary
and
plus
two
examinations,
no
big
meetings
were
convened
during
this
period
and
the
exception
was
the
large
rally
held
at
the
brigade
Parade
Grounds
on
March
25.
Speakers
sent
from
the
state
center
addressed
more
than
1500
meetings.
Comrade
Jyoti
Basu
put
in
an
amazing
amount
of
effort
for
his
age.
Among
those
who
took
part
in
the
campaign
were;
Harkishan
Singh
Surjeet,
Prakash
Karat,
Manik
Sarkar,
M
K
Pandhe,
and
Sitaram
Yechury.
Among
others
who
took
part
in
the
campaign
were
Brinda
Karat,
Subodh
Roy
and
Janardan
Pati.
Laloo
Prasad
Yadav
came
to
address
some
meetings
from
Bihar.
Some
student-youth
leaders
from
other
states
also
took
part
in
the
campaign.
ELECTION
RESULTS
AND
SOME
FEATURES
3.1
The
elections
results
have
been
declared.
In
1996,
of
the
294
seats,
the
CPI
(M)
had
got
150
and
the
Left
front
in
all
203.
This
time
we
got
143
seats
and
the
Left
Front,
199.
Some
seats
were
lost
but
by
making
a
breakthrough
in
circumstances
of
stiff
challenges,
the
success
has
been
without
precedent
and
encouraging.
It
has
been
proven
beyond
doubt
that
if
we
succeed
in
keeping
our
Party,
dear
to
us
all,
free
from
the
evil
effects
of
the
bourgeois
society,
we
can
certainly
keep
trust
of
the
people
and
rely
upon
them.
It
may
not
be
possible
to
make
an
assessment
either
at
the
state
level
or
at
the
levels
of
the
districts
and
localities
right
now.
The
district
reports
and
the
understanding
of
the
state
leadership
allow
us
to
make
a
few
observations.
3.2
At
the
very
outset,
the
party
and
the
people
of
Midnapore,
Bankura,
and
Hooghly
need
to
be
congratulated.
Putting
their
life
at
stake,
they
took
the
people
along
with
them
and
defeated
the
terror-tactics
and
put
a
stop
to
the
spread
of
terror.
This
has
had
a
positive
effect
on
the
elections
this
year.
The
challenge
thrown
to
the
so-called
“Panskura
line”
encouraged
the
Party
and
the
people
throughout
the
state
to
rally
around.
Congratulations
should
be
extended
also
to
the
Party
and
the
people
of
north
Bengal
and
of
the
district
of
Jalpaiguri
who
stopped
the
Kamtapuri
attacks
in
their
tracks
and
paid
for
the
success
in
blood.
3.3
There
were
good
gatherings
in
the
campaign
meetings
and
the
people
listened
to
the
speakers
to
the
end.
Because
of
the
posture
of
confidence
and
threat
forthcoming
from
the
Trinamul
Congress,
the
spirited
outlook
of
the
Party
workers
and
sympathizers
made
sure
that
the
meetings
went
on
becoming
bigger.
Even
those
who
do
not
vote
for
us
joined
in
to
attend
the
meetings.
They
listened
to
whatever
we
had
to
say
about
liberalization,
central
budget,
democracy,
and
our
successes,
although
all
this
may
not
have
translated
in
a
big
way
into
changing
their
opinion
in
our
favour.
But
the
powerful
campaign
energized
the
people
and
checked
the
fervour
and
the
loquaciousness
of
our
opponents
and
pushed
them
onto
the
defensive.
The
end
result
was
positive.
3.4
Our
campaign
about
the
danger
of
authoritarianism
did
have
an
effect.
The
threats
and
low-grade
comments
of
the
Trinamul
leader
made
our
followers
consolidated
and
determined.
It
also
created
worries
among
other
sections
of
the
people
about
the
future.
A
section
of
well
known
artistes,
litterateurs,
and
other
intellectuals
who
do
not
otherwise
take
an
active
part
on
behalf
of
the
Left
Front
did
do
so
this
time.
There
was
thus
an
atmosphere
created
in
our
favour.
It
is
also
to
be
noted
that
while
the
threatening
pronouncements
of
the
opposition
went
to
increase
the
firmness
of
most
of
our
workers
and
sympathizers,
it
also
created
indecisiveness
among
small
sections
of
them.
3.5
The
pro-people
policy
of
the
state
government
and
the
work
of
development
left
its
positive
impact
on
the
people.
The
effect
of
developmental
work
is,
however,
dependent
on
circumstances.
In
an
underdeveloped
country
as
ours,
the
condition
and
the
standard
of
living
remain
low.
Thanks
to
the
effect
of
the
electronic
media
that
bombard
the
people
with
a
limitless
vista
of
riches,
the
desire
among
the
people
living
in
an
repressed
state
progresses
by
leaps
and
bounds.
That
is
why
it
has
been
seen
that
the
results
of
development
would
be
negligible
unless
the
need
to
sharpen
political
struggle
in
the
task
of
raising
the
political
consciousness
of
the
people
with
regard
to
the
present
social-economic
system,
the
policies
of
the
central
government,
and
the
subject
of
center-state
relations
is
properly
emphasized
and
implemented.
3.6
What
has
further
advanced
the
prestige
of
the
Party
and
has
had
a
positive
impact
on
the
people
has
to
be
seen
in
two
developments.
First,
the
open
strife
among
the
opposition
on
the
issue
of
power.
Second,
the
unprecedented
manner
in
which
Comrade
Jyoti
Basu
chose
to
step
down
on
health
grounds
out
of
his
own
volition
and
kept
up
campaign
work,
plus
the
acceptability
among
the
people
of
Buddhadeb
Bhattacharjee
as
the
new
chief
minister.
3.7
The
dubbing
of
floods
in
the
wake
of
three
continuous
days
of
incessant
rain
as
“man-made”
and
the
unwillingness
of
the
union
government
to
send
in
assistance
as
well
as
the
role
played
by
our
Party
and
the
government
in
providing
flood
relief
including
rescuing
of
the
stricken
people
have
come
worked
to
our
favour
for
the
polls.
3.8
The
desertion
by
a
small
section
and
their
setting
up
a
new
party
and
the
backing
they
received
from
the
media
as
far
as
publicity
is
concerned
has
also
helped
us.
Their
attack
full
of
calumny
on
the
issue
of
democracy
in
conjunction
with
the
Trinamul
Congress
isolated
them
from
the
people.
At
first
the
workers
of
the
Congress-Trinamul
alliance
assisted
these
elements
in
campaign
work
and
in
organization
of
rallies.
While
most
of
them
subsequently
chose
to
return
to
their
own
folds,
those
confused
could
not.
Despite
this,
they
could
poll
an
average
of
1500-2000
per
candidate.
In
one
or
two
constituencies
they
polled
around
3000
and
it
should
be
noted
that
despite
being
an
MP,
Saifuddin
Chaudhuri
could
poll
just
4900
votes
in
a
constituency
that
falls
in
his
parliamentary
seat.
Not
all
the
votes
they
polled
were
ours.
But
in
south
24
Parganas
and
adjoining
areas
they
did
manage
to
ensure
defeat
of
our
candidates
in
five
constituencies.
By
keeping
the
party
unit
inactive
while
pretending
to
remain
with
the
Party
and
continuing
to
be
the
district
secretary,
the
person
concerned
carried
on
preparations
for
a
factional
endevour.
Then
he
chose
to
decamp
with
documents,
funds,
and
other
equipment
of
the
party.
The
south
24
Parganas
district
committee
did
not
have
the
time
to
regroup
in
such
a
short
period
before
the
polls.
3.9
Trinamul
Congress
gave
the
call
for
a
grand
alliance
with
BJP.
Then
they
took
in
the
Kamtapuris
who
subsequently
walked
out.
With
the
Tehelka-exposure
raising
the
stench
of
corruption,
the
Trinamul
Congress
as
a
protective
measure
and
to
gather
the
votes
of
the
minority
communities
sought
to
dissolve
the
alliance
with
the
BJP
and
went
in
for
a
fresh
alliance
with
Congress
and
the
Jharkhand
Mukti
Morcha.
The
new
alliance
concentrated
their
ire
not
against
the
BJP
but
against
us.
The
initiative
of
the
Trinamul
to
keep
unclear
the
relation
with
NDA
and
their
sudden
preference
for
the
Congress
helped
us
to
unmask
the
unprincipled
self
of
the
Congress-Trinamul
alliance.
3.10
The
Union
budget
was
placed
when
the
Trinamul
Congress
was
in
the
NDA.
This
year’s
budget
has
unmasked
the
true
face
of
liberalization
and
served
to
push
the
alliance
and
the
BJP
into
a
defensive
position.
The
reaction
to
the
budget,
too,
may
have
influenced
the
Trinamul
Congress
to
change
partners.
3.11
The
closer
the
polls
got
the
more
uncontrolled
the
Trinamul
Congress
became
in
their
insane
megalomaniac
actions.
The
state
center
of
the
Party
openly
warned
the
Party
and
the
people
that
there
was
a
real
possibility
of
attempts
to
create
violent
events
to
try
and
influence
the
people.
This
was
effective
in
blocking
the
plots.
3.12
Compared
to
the
past
more
and
more
young
men
and
women
could
be
involved
in
the
polls.
If
they
are
not
made
politically
conscious,
there
is
the
possibility
of
their
hopes
being
shattered
and
discontent
being
generated.
3.13
Women
were
more
active
organizationally
this
time.
There
was
good
attendance
in
the
women’s
rallies
as
well.
3.14
the
unity
of
the
Left
Front
was
better
compared
to
that
in
the
past.
There
was
sincere
urge
for
unity
among
the
top
leaders,
but
lower
down
this
could
not
be
implemented
in
some
instances.
We
are
the
principal
force
in
the
Left
Front
and
the
Left
Front
cannot
function
without
our
sincere
efforts.
In
some
very
minor
instances,
our
sincere
approach.
The
district
committees,
will
have
to
enquire
and
make
the
correct
assessment.
There
were
differences
of
opinion
in
the
RSP
and
the
Forward
Bloc.
The
disunity
in
RSP
caused
some
losses
to
occur
in
Murshidabad
and
Jalpaiguri.
At
least
one
more
seat
could
have
been
won
had
there
not
been
inner
conflict
in
the
Forward
Bloc.
3.15
The
statistics
of
these
elections
have
been
published
separately.
In
sum
we
can
say
that
in
comparison
with
1996,
our
voting
percentage
decreased
slightly
by
0.33%.
The
percentage
of
votes
polled
by
the
Left
Front
has
increased
in
Coochbehar,
Howrah,
Maldah,
Hooghly
and
Kolkata.
The
lowest
increase
is
in
Kolkata
(+0.33%)
and
the
highest
in
Coochbehar
(+9.36%).
In
Coochbehar
during
the
last
Vidhan
Sabha
polls,
Kamal
Guha
of
Forward
Bloc
had
an
electoral
understanding
with
the
Congress
after
forming
the
Socialist
Forward
Bloc.
This
time
he
was
back
in
the
Forward
Bloc
and
joined
the
Left
Font.
We
have
won
all
the
seats
of
this
district.
The
percentage
remains
as
before
in
north
24
Parganas.
In
the
other
districts,
our
support
base
has
eroded.
Highest
in
Darjeeling
district
(-8.30%)
and
the
lowest
in
Bankura
(-0.3%).
Our
seats
did
not
go
down
in
Nadia
but
our
vote
share
did
which
is
alarming
(at
–6.16%).
We
have
again
won
all
the
seats
in
south
Dinajpore
although
our
vote
share
has
gone
down.
In
1996,
Congress
was
unified
and
had
gone
in
for
an
alliance
with
the
Jharkhandis.
Last
time
they
polled
39.69%
of
votes.
This
time,
there
was
unity
between
Congress,
Trinamul,
and
Jharkhandis
(seven
seats).
The
alliance
got
39.45%
of
votes.
The
addition
of
three
rebel
candidates’
votes
would
increase
the
percentage
slightly.
BJP
which
got
6.45%
in
1996,
got
5.19%
in
these
polls
but
their
vote
share
in
Purulia,
Nadia,
Darjeeling,
and
Midnapore
has
increased.
The
increase
is
by
2.32%
in
Purulia,
and
0.37%
in
Midnapore.
While
their
support
has
gone
down
among
other
sections
of
the
people,
they
have
tried
to
make
some
headway
among
scheduled
tribes,
Nepalis,
and
Bodos.
This
is
seen
in
Jalpaiguri,
Maldah
etc.
3.16
The
Kamtapuris
did
not
get
any
seat
and
on
the
other
hand
we
have
managed
to
increase
our
support.
The
vote
share
of
the
Kamtapuris
should
not
be
ignored.
They
got
2.09%
in
Coochbehar
for
nine
seats,
8.60%
in
Jalpaiguri
for
11
seats,
6.85%
in
Darjeeling
for
two
seats,
and
2.82%
in
Maldah
for
two
seats.
Their
workers
did
not
slacken
efforts
despite
the
certainty
of
defeat.
3.17
Despite
electoral
defeat,
the
gatherings
which
turned
up
at
the
meetings
of
the
Trinamul
leader
should
not
be
ignored.
And
in
spite
of
the
belated
commencement
of
the
rallies,
a
large
section
would
wait
with
patience.
The
number
of
the
poor
people
in
their
midst,
too,
should
not
be
glossed
over.
Anti-communist
hostilities
that
arose
out
of
local
confrontations
made
them
go
in
favour
of
the
Trinamul
Congress.
They
have
also
managed
to
get
votes
in
good
measure
in
some
constituencies
despite
the
lack
of
public
campaign
work.
3.18
The
BJP
could
increase
its
vote
share
quite
well
in
some
seats.
They
have
played
the
traditional
communal
card
over
and
above
their
anti
Left
Front
slandering.
They
launched
attacks
on
the
Gangas
water-sharing
agreement
and
infiltration.
They
also
campaigned
that
the
policy
of
liberalization
was
in
the
interest
of
the
country.
In
some
instances,
their
supporters
supported
the
Trinamul;
elsewhere
they
chose
to
attack
the
Trinamul.
3.19
We
had
changed
candidates
in
77
seats.
Of
these
44
were
constituencies,
which
we
had
won
earlier,
and
33
where
we
had
been
defeated
in
1996.
This
time
we
won
in
46.
We
lost
nine
seats
that
we
had
won
earlier.
We
won
in
11
seats
where
we
had
earlier
lost.
ROLE
OF
THE
VARIOUS
SECTIONS
OF
THE
PEOPLE
4.1
No
uniform
picture
can
be
presented
in
this
regard.
There
were
differential
outcomes
in
districts
and
within
districts.
Detailed
and
specific
review
alone
can
bring
out
the
true
picture.
4.2(1)
We
could
generally
maintain
our
support
base
among
the
khet
mazdoors,
the
sharecroppers
and
the
rural
poor,
but
there
was
some
erosion
in
some
instances.
The
petty
bourgeois
frame
of
mind
in
the
Party
has
resulted
in
a
lack
of
interest
in
the
khet
mazdoor
movement
(with
the
exception
of
4-5
districts)
and
this
has
slackened
our
bonds
with
them.
There
is
information
about
instances
of
allurements
for
votes
taking
place.
4.2(2)
In
areas
where
khet
mazdoor
movement
has
flourished,
there
has
been
an
increase
of
rights
and
not
that
much
of
political
consciousness.
This
creates
an
opportunistic
frame
of
mind
and
creates
discontent
among
others.
With
a
lack
of
workers
who
possess
a
class-based
outlook,
any
interference
in
a
bureaucratic
manner
in
matters
of
opportunism
makes
the
discontent
increase.
This
is
something
that
will
be
difficult
to
tackle
unless
we
ensure
the
bringing
up
of
party
workers
from
the
poor
and
then
to
equip
them
properly
with
political
consciousness.
The
whole
party
has
to
give
thought
to
this
aspect.
4.3
In
areas
which
were
touched
by
the
terror
campaign
and
in
areas
that
have
shaken
free
from
terror,
the
class-tenacity
of
the
poor
against
the
Trinamul
alliance
has
also
influenced
various
other
classes.
4.4
The
majority
of
the
scheduled
caste
people
are
poor.
We
are
their
principal
strength.
We
have
won
67.68%
of
the
seats
while
we
have
won
48
out
of
59
(i.e.,
80%)
seats
in
the
scheduled
caste
areas.
We
have
an
even
greater
amount
of
influence
in
the
scheduled
tribes
despite
the
formation
of
the
Jharkhand
state
and
they
have
remained
with
us.
We
have
won
16
of
the
17
scheduled
tribe
seats
i.e.,
94%.
We
have
lost
the
Kalchini
seat
due
local
causes.
Among
the
scheduled
caste's
the
Mundas
and
the
Oraons
are
solidly
with
us.
In
one
instance,
however,
our
Santhal
candidate
has
lost
some
votes
to
the
Trinamul
candidate
who
was
an
Oraon.
But
we
did
win
this
seat.
The
deshwali
majhis
of
Midnapore,
Bankura,
and
Purulia
got
confused
on
the
issue
of
their
recognition
as
scheduled
tribe.
A
section
of
the
Santhals
too
got
confused
over
the
issues
of
Alchiki
script
and
Santhali
language.
The
majority
of
the
Rajbanshis
have
remained
with
us
although
support
for
the
Kamtapuris
must
not
be
overlooked.
4.5
A
section
of
the
middle
farmers
remain
with
us.
We
need
to
do
a
booth-wise
review
to
find
the
correct
picture.
With
one
or
two
exceptions,
ideological
compulsions
kept
the
rich
peasants
arrayed
against
us.
Liberalization
of
the
economy
did
create
some
doubts
among
them
but
not
enough
to
change
camps.
4.6
With
the
crisis
overwhelming
the
industries,
the
campaign
we
have
conducted
against
liberalization
appears
to
have
had
little
effect
upon
the
organized
and
unorganized
workers.
The
view
has
gained
ground
that
the
Left
Front
can
take
remedial
measure
and
cure
the
problem
if
it
so
desires.
It
is
difficult
to
demarcate
which
are
the
industrial
seats
and
which
are
not.
Still,
in
areas
marked
as
industrial
we
got
42
seats
as
against
49
the
last
time
around.
Doubtless
our
support
base
among
colliery
mazdoors
has
increased.
Some
advance
could
also
be
made
in
the
case
of
non-Bengali
Hindu
workers.
4.7
We
believe
that
we
could
make
some
more
inroads
amongst
the
middle
class
employees
in
the
public
and
private
sectors.
The
support
did
not
reflect
the
kind
of
leading
role
the
advanced
sections
among
them
had
displayed
this
time,
however.
4.8
With
a
few
exceptions,
non-Bengali
Muslims
continued
to
support
us.
Asansol
was
an
exception
where
we
did
not
get
the
expected
support.
With
the
Hirapur
seat
left
to
the
Rashtriya
Janata
Dal
(RJD),
there
was
a
rebellion
amidst
a
large
section
of
zonal
and
local
levels.
The
Party
took
measures
against
then
and
a
campaign
was
carried
in
the
fullest
sense
in
favour
of
the
RJD
candidate.
Since
the
RJD
candidate
was
a
Muslim,
there
was
slander
campaign
that
the
CPI
(M)
has
deliberately
let
him
down.
This
confused
a
section
of
the
Urdu-speaking
Muslims.
The
Bengali
minority
community
remained
with
us
because
of
class-based
reasoning.
Muslim
fundamentalists
were
more
active
against
us
this
year.
Secret
campaigning
was
carried
out
that
Saifuddin
Chaudhury
had
been
removed
because
he
was
a
Muslim
and
how
the
Left
Front
had
done
little
for
reservation
for
Muslims,
and
has
interfered
with
the
building
of
mosques.
Some
cases
of
fatwas
being
issued
by
the
moulvis
in
a
coordinated
way
has
been
noticed.
Generally
we
have
been
supported
well
by
the
Muslims
in
general.
Of
the
41
MLA's
of
the
minority
community,
there
are
27
from
Left
Front,
10
from
Congress,
one
from
Trinamul,
and
3
independent
candidates
who
were
disgruntled
Congress
candidates.
4.9
We
have
gained
ground
among
the
refugees
who
live
in
the
refugee
colonies
although
not
generally
among
the
people
of
erstwhile
East
Bengal.
4.10
We
had
expected
our
vote
share
to
go
up
among
the
small
traders
of
towns
and
cities.
While
this
was
not
reflected
everywhere,
we
did
get
their
increased
support
in
general.
5.1
There
has
been
a
notable
downturn
in
the
percentage
of
votes
cast.
It
was
80.13%
in
1996.
This
year
it
is
73.58%.
The
highest
drop
has
been
in
Kolkata
(-11.89%)
and
the
lowest
in
north
Dinajpore
(-5.28%).
This
is
noticeable
in
the
background
of
intense
political
struggle.
The
report
received
from
the
districts
show
these
features:
(1)
There
is
some
impact
of
the
system
introduced
of
photo
ID
cards.
(2)
Those
who
do
not
traditionally
vote
for
us
did
not
go
out
to
vote
in
disgust
(3)
A
section
of
supporters
who
are
poor
could
not
come
back
to
cast
their
vote
in
time
after
having
earlier
gone
out
in
search
of
work
(4)
Threat
of
rain
was
a
factor,
as
was
the
urgency
to
reap
the
boro
crop.
With
votes
being
cast
in
machine
there
was
no
instance
as
earlier
of
voters
standing
in
line
with
slips
even
after
the
scheduled
time
had
gone
by.
This
time
most
polling
booths
downed
shutters
at
4
in
the
afternoon
catching
some
of
our
rural
supporters
like
the
khet
mazdoors
on
the
wrong
foot.
The
number
of
such
occurrences
did
not
involve
more
than
20-30
voters
per
booth
although
in
some
instances
the
number
was
larger.
The
state
committee
could
not
issue
cautionary
notice
earlier
as
it
was
not
aware
of
this
phenomenon.
But
it
is
to
be
noted
that
class
tenacity
has
generally
gone
down
among
the
poor.
6.1
Symbols
were
printed
on
ballot
papers
hitherto.
Our
symbol
was
generally
drawn
in
thin
lines
but
this
caused
no
problems.
The
plastic
cover
obfuscated
the
view
of
our
symbol
this
time.
Complaints
started
to
come
once
the
machine
has
been
sealed,
and
by
then
it
was
too
late.
We
need
to
draw
our
symbol
in
thicker
lines.
6.2
The
electronic
voting
machine
was
not
fixed
firmly
on
the
table.
We
had
trained
our
supporters
to
vote
with
the
machine
in
the
correct
position
and
the
buttons
on
the
right
side.
Whenever
the
machine
was
turned
away
from
this
position,
some
amount
of
confusion
would
arise.
We
think
that
the
plastic
cover
should
be
clearer
and
the
symbol
placed
right
under
the
switch.
LOCAL
PARTY
ORGANISATION
AND
ITS
INFLUENCE
7.1
Such
issues
as
those
concerning
the
international
situation,
the
national
and
state
scenario,
do
have
an
effect
on
the
voting.
But
the
impact
of
local
issues
is
much
higher.
Not
just
in
the
period
of
the
election
time
but
the
stream
of
continuous
political
struggles
have
the
necessary
effects
on
the
polls.
The
chief
reasons
behind
the
extension
of
support
must
be
found
in
the
level
of
political
consciousness
of
the
local
leadership
and
the
workers,
the
unity
of
Party
functioning
at
various
tiers,
clarity
and
honesty
that
mark
the
daily
working
of
the
Panchayats,
municipalities,
TU’s
and
Kisan
sabhas
and
other
mass
fronts.
The
indices
also
include
respecting
the
democratic
aspirations
of
the
people,
having
a
profile
before
the
people
that
reflects
Communist
behaviour,
and
skill
in
conducting
political-ideological
campaign.
The
differences
in
the
make
up
of
the
population
in
various
areas
too
influences
the
polls.
7.2
The
rectification
campaign
that
was
to
be
run
from
the
Central
and
the
state
committee
onwards
has
become
formal
and
is
not
being
implemented
in
practice
and
with
sincerity.
The
problem
runs
deeper
than
what
we
had
imagined
it
to
be.
There
is
no
scope
for
any
pause
even
in
the
midst
of
the
pressure
from
undertaking
other
tasks.
A
non-personal
and
non-specific
discussion
would
be
of
no
help.
The
moment
any
deviation
comes
into
observance,
it
should
be
discussed
organizationally,
criticized,
and
rectified.
Through
this
process
the
Communist
values
of
all
workers
would
get
improved.
7.3
Our
attention
was
drawn
to
quite
a
few
cases
of
those
aspiring
to
be
candidates
and
factional
squabbles
as
a
result,
and
a
careless
frame
of
mind
on
the
part
of
the
local
leadership
including
district
committee
members
as
far
as
Party
tasks
are
concerned.
These
are
harmful
portents
and
but
for
these
developments
we
could
have
won
a
few
more
seats.
7.4
While
this
was
not
a
general
phenomenon,
the
fact
remains
that
we
have
polled
fewer
votes
in
certain
Panchayat
areas
where
we
hold
office,
and
more
votes
in
areas
where
we
are
not
in
office
in
the
Panchayats.
The
lessons
are
easy
enough
to
draw
here.
7.5
In
the
backdrop
of
the
Trinamul
leader
calling
the
floods
“man
made”,
the
kind
of
rescue
work
our
Party
workers
did
has
enhanced
our
prestige.
The
supply
of
relief
material
was
organized
in
a
much
better
manner
with
more
materials
reached
out
to
the
affected
than
any
time
in
the
past.
Yet,
the
slightest
of
unprincipled
deviation
has
made
popular
opinion
go
against
us.
7.6
In
conducting
the
intense
campaign,
we
had
called
for
face-to-face
meets
with
the
people
during
the
village
level
meetings.
This
was
not
always
done
everywhere.
The
workers
who
deviated
from
principles
did
take
part
in
the
election
campaign
but
dared
not
come
face-to-face
with
the
people.
7.7
The
booth-wise
results
have
remained
at
a
lower
level
than
that
presupposed
during
pre-election
booth-wise
surveys.
Except
by
conducting
survey
in
the
backdrop
of
campaign
work,
house-to-house
approach,
face-to-face
discussions,
dividing
up
the
people
“for
and
against”
as
per
presupposition
does
not
reflect
the
true
picture.
7.8
Delays
have
occurred
in
many
instances
in
mobilizing
all
sections
of
the
workers
in
the
election
campaign
work.
In
some
instances
pressures
exerted
by
the
initiative
of
the
people
have
compelled
the
workers
to
get
down
to
work
in
larger
numbers.
8.1
Detailed
analysis
and
review
is
not
possible
at
the
level
of
either
the
state
or
of
the
districts.
This
is
possible
at
lower
levels
via
booth
wise
exercises.
The
task
is
to
be
completed
on
a
strict
time-schedule.
It
is
not
merely
a
task
that
explains
our
victories
and
our
defeats.
In
111
seats
we
have
got
over
50%
votes.
Yet,
we
have
lost
seats
where
we
have
polled
more
than
45%
votes.
We
have
also
won
in
seats
where
our
vote
share
has
been
lower.
The
basic
issue
to
address
is
whether
our
support
base
is
flourishing
or
eroding
and
if
the
latter
among
which
sections
of
the
society
does
it
happen?
The
working
people
of
villages
and
cities
comprise
our
basic
strength.
We
need
to
identify
the
gains
and
losses
among
these
people
over
the
years
and
at
present.
8.2
A
section
of
the
working
people
have
not
merely
turned
away
from
us
but
have
become
inimical
to
us.
Without
local
unprincipled
behaviour,
arrogance,
wrong
functioning
such
hostile
frame
of
mind
can
never
develop.
That
the
confused
people
remain
our
class
allies
and
not
class
enemies
could
not
sink
into
the
realization
of
the
Party
comrades
despite
our
telling
them
so
in
the
past.
Following
electoral
reverses
these
sections
remain
dispirited.
We
need
to
approach
them
before
they
are
made
to
become
aggressive.
We
have
to
approach
them
not
with
anger
and
bitterness
but
with
empathy
of
their
close
relations,
and
we
must
know
the
reasons
why
they
have
become
frustrated
and
angry
with
us,
and
if
wrong
has
been
committed
we
must
rectify
it
appropriately
and
on
an
emergent
basis.
8.3
A
petty-bourgeois-like
hesitation
lingers
in
the
mindset
while
going
ahead
with
organizing
the
khet
mazdoors.
Initiatives
should
be
taken
from
the
district
centers
of
the
party
to
do
away
with
such
tendencies.
It
is
important
and
emergent
to
bring
up
workers
from
among
the
khet
mazdoors
and
to
put
them
through
a
process
of
political
development.
8.4
Panchayat
polls
are
but
two
years
away.
The
process
of
booth-wise
counting
has
made
clear
our
position
at
the
moment
as
far
as
vote
share
is
concerned.
On
the
basis
of
this,
we
have
to
strengthen
our
supervision
on
the
working
of
Panchayats
where
we
hold
office.
We
have
to
provide
special
emphasis
on
doing
away
with
all
kinds
of
mistakes
and
errors
and
make
sure
of
the
participation
of
the
people.
The
small
issues
that
does
not
need
great
expense
for
tackling
suitably
must
be
resolved
on
an
emergent
basis.
We
need
to
discuss
the
working
of
the
Panchayats
again
at
the
state
level.
We
have
also
to
identify
the
corrupt
working
of
the
Panchayats
run
by
the
opposition
and
highlight
their
misdeeds
and
lead
popular
movements
against
them
by
organising
the
people.
8.5
The
number
of
unorganized
workers
spread
over
villages
and
towns
in
a
distracted
pattern
is
considerable.
While
there
are
formal
organisations
for
them,
very
few
of
these
organizations
touch
anything
but
the
marginal
fringes
of
the
unorganized
workers
themselves.
Without
initiative
on
the
part
of
the
local
party
units
it
is
not
possible
to
either
bring
them
within
the
fold
of
the
organisation
in
a
real
sense
and
to
make
them
conscious.
Initiatives
must
be
taken
in
this
regard.
8.6
The
assembly
polls
have
seen
the
participation
of
very
many
new
faces
–
both
young
men
and
women.
We
have
train
them
up
ideologically
and
politically
otherwise
there
is
the
danger
of
losing
them
for
lack
of
guidance
or
their
becoming
victims
of
despair.
A
study
course
must
be
drawn
up
from
the
state
level
to
bring
them
into
the
process
of
educative
discussion
sessions.
8.7
There
is
a
continuous
erosion
of
idealism,
Communist
morality
and
democratic
centralism
within
the
Party
organisation.
Factional
feuds
continue
to
linger.
These
are
dangerous
portents.
It
is
essential
to
commence
inner-Party
struggle
against
these
tendencies.
The
process
must
be
decided
at
and
started
from
the
state
level.
A
syllabus
must
be
drawn
up
to
improve
the
standards
of
ideological
and
political
standards
and
Party
education
given
adequate
emphasis.
8.8
The
role
of
mass
collection
is
crucially
important
for
expanding
our
mass
base
and
mass
contact.
Monthly
mass
collection
must
be
started
forthwith
as
a
regular
programme.
8.9
Trinamul
Congress
is
the
principle
opposition
group
in
the
state
and
despite
the
fact
that
the
BJP
has
not
managed
to
win
any
seats,
especially
because
of
their
position
at
the
Center,
the
danger
that
they
pose
must
not
be
underplayed.
Slowly
but
steadily
they
have
been
engaged
in
spreading
the
poison
of
fundamentalism
and
communal
disharmony.
They
are
supporting
the
aggressive
policies
of
US
imperialism
and
becoming
desperately
implementing
the
policy
of
liberalization.
Thus
it
would
be
wrong
to
slacken
off
the
struggle
against
these
policies.
8.10 The sale and circulation of Ganashakti was increased in a planned manner during the polls. Booth-wise sale of Ganashakti was undertaken at a number of places. The number of boards where Ganashakti was displayed too had gone up. But we find that there are payments overdue from sales and that the agencies have started to close down. The scale of sale of the special issues of the newspaper during the time of the elections must be continued. It is also important to increase the sale of the Hindi Swadhinta and Deshhitaishi. Further, it is not just a matter of increasing the sale and circulation but also about fostering the habit of reading the publications among party workers.