The
Marxist
Volume: 18, No. 01
January-March 2002
Israel-Palestine Conflict: Sharonism Rampant
Vijay
Prashad
1.
The
Zeevi
Invasion
US President George W. Bush changed the rules of international engagement on the evening of 11 September 2001. In response to the horrible attacks on New York City and Washington DC, Bush rejected the slow wisdom of justice for the impatient brutality of revenge. “Either you are with us,” Bush said to the world community, “or you are against us.” Those who do not assist the United States government in its quest to uproot the forces of terror will themselves be seen as terrorists.
On 5 October 2001, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon sent tanks and troops of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) into Hebron in the West Bank. The incursion into Palestinian Authority (PA) controlled land of what was once the Occupied Territories came as a result of an escalation of provocations from the Israeli government against the Palestinians. Sharon offered the same logic as Bush – either the PA is with the Israeli government in its attempt to repress all forms of militancy (now labeled terrorism) or else the PA is a legitimate target. If the Taliban can be overthrown to get Osama bin Laden and al-Qa’ida, then so can the PA. Even as PA chairman Yasser Arafat backed the US war against Afghanistan that began two days later, and even as radical Palestinians accepted this posture in the name of Palestinian unity, the IDF continued its onslaught. One provocation followed another.[i]
The most important event that led to the current crisis was the IDF assassination of Abu Ali Mustafa, the head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (the Marxist-Leninist formation from 1968 and, until February 2002, a key part of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, PLO). The IDF fired two missiles into Abu Ali Mustafa’s office in Ramallah, not far from the office of Arafat, on 27 August 2001. The IDF is famous for its policy of “targeted killings,” in other words, the assassination of leaders and militants of organizations that it dislikes. Rabah Muhana, of the PFLP, in grief, warned the world, “We will seek to target and harm Israeli criminal leaders to respond to the assassination of Abu Ali Mustafa and to block further Israeli attacks on Palestinian leaders.” On 17 October, the PFLP kept its word with the spectacular assassination of Sharon’s most right-wing cabinet minister Rehavam Zeevi. Even as the PA condemned the assassination (“We feel sorry about this assassination. We reject all forms of political assassinations,” said PA cabinet minister Yasser Abed Rabbo), Sharon blamed the PA, “The responsibility is Arafat’s alone, as someone who has carried out and is carrying out acts of terrorism and never took steps against it.” Even as the IDF fired the first shot, Sharon’s cabinet secretary Gideon Saar told the press that if Arafat did not hand over the PFLP militants, “There will be no choice but to view [the PA] as a state that supports terror and to act against it.” The Bush doctrine provided Sharonism with an opportunity to excise the PA and the Palestinians. Sharon promised to “carry out a war to the bitter end against the terrorists.” We are now in the midst of just this war.
On 18 October, the IDF killed three Palestinians in a car explosion, and although the IDF had left Hebron on 14 October, they now came back in force into several West Bank towns: Bethlehem, Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin and elsewhere. The incursions and assassinations became a full-blown invasion of those areas given over to the Palestinian leadership through the Oslo Accords of 1993. A defiant Sharon ignored international condemnation and promised to invite a million Jews to occupy regions now held by the PA (7 November 2001). Massive IDF force was met by a spate of suicide bombings, as the poorly armed David tried to mount feeble and horrific acts of retaliation against Goliath’s US-made and US-aided tanks, helicopters and ordinance.[ii]
The US offered an early rebuke of IDF actions, first on 5 October (when the White House rejected the Israeli government’s assessment that its anti-terrorist Arab coalition was akin to the appeasement of the Nazis), then again on 22 October (when the US State Department’s Philip Reeker said, “Israeli defense forces should be withdrawn immediately from all Palestinian-controlled areas, and no further such incursions should be made”). By mid-November, when it became clear that the Fifth Afghan War was a foregone conclusion, the US once again returned to its brazen pro-Israel posture. Certainly, the State Department sent a series of officials to conduct negotiations and to mediate between the two parties, but it did not condemn Sharon’s disregard of these attempts (on 20 November, the day after US Secretary of State Colin Powell offered a vision for peace, the IDF razed homes in Gaza and secured an armed settlement in Hebron; three days later, as a US peace mission arrived in Israel, the IDF assassinated a Hamas leader; again, three days after this, Sharon replaced the moderate Israeli negotiator with a Hawk). By early December (on the 3rd to be exact), the White House rejected calls from around the world to condemn Sharon’s administration and instead asked that Arafat do more against Palestinian militants. By 11 April 2002, the day before Secretary of State Powell ended his failed trip to Israel and the PA, the White House showed its hand when its spokesman called Sharon a “man of peace” and then said, “Chairman Arafat has yet to earn the President’s trust.” Sharonism earned the benediction of the White House as his men went forth to erase the Palestinians from the twenty two percent of their pre-1948 lands. If 1948 is known as the naqba (catastrophe) among the Palestinians, what might they call 2002?
2. The Meaning of Sharonism.
Angry
at
the
widespread
anti-Semitism
of
many
European
states
and
by
the
pogroms
engineered
by
governments
and
conducted
by
their
fellow
citizens,
many
European
Jews
dreamed
of
a
land
of
their
own,
far
from
the
outrages
of
racism.
Theodor
Herzl’s
The
Jewish
State
(1896)
laid
out
the
argument
for
a
national
home,
but
he
thought
that
Turkey
maybe
the
site;
the
next
year,
now
President
of
the
World
Zionist
Organization,
he
felt
that
the
German
Kaiser
might
help
the
Zionists
gain
a
homeland
in
Palestine.
A
weak
Kaiser
being
no
help,
Herzl
turned
to
the
British
whose
Colonial
Secretary
Joseph
Chamberlain
told
Herzl
that
he
“liked
the
Zionist
idea.
If
I
could
show
him
a
spot
among
the
British
possessions
which
was
not
yet
inhabited
by
white
settlers,
then
we
could
talk.”
Herzl
studied
the
condition
of
Uganda,
Cyprus
and
the
Sinai
(as
well
as
Italian
Tripoli,
Portuguese
Mozambique
and
Belgian
Congo)
before
he
settled
once
more
on
Palestine.[iii]
Zionism,
in
this
complex
incarnation,
was
a
desire
for
release
from
European
racism,
a
cry
for
land
as
well
as
a
disregard
of
the
people
who
may
occupy
the
land
already
(the
alliance
with
colonialism
makes
this
tendency
clear).
Zionism
continues
to
be
an
ambivalent
social
force,
rich
in
its
desire
for
justice
(so
that
socialist
Zionism
led
to
the
kibbutzim,
a
way
to
organize
society
outside
the
strictures
of
capitalist
relations)
and
simultaneously
in
its
vision
of
liberation
for
the
Jewish
people
at
all
costs.
Sharonism
is
Gun
Zionism
alone,
an
intolerance
that
knows
no
contradiction,
only
violence.
Sharonism’s
slogan
in
1948
was
“A
land
without
people,
for
a
people
without
land,”
a
racist
denial
of
the
almost
seven
hundred
thousand
Arabs
who
lived
along
the
Levantine
coastline.[iv]
Once
the
Balfour
Declaration
(1917)
revoked
the
right
of
the
Palestinians
to
their
own
land
and
gave
it,
in
a
seemingly
magnanimous
gesture,
to
the
Jewish
people,
Sharonism
sought
to
remove
the
Palestinians
from
their
homeland.
During
the
mandate
period,
liberal
Zionists
saw
Palestine
as
a
two
people
state.
David
Ben-Gurion,
as
leader
of
the
Jewish
Workers’
Party
(MAPAI)
saw
the
Arabs
as
“an
organic,
inseparable
part
of
Palestine”
(1925),
so
that
he
told
the
17th
Zionist
Congress,
“We
declare
before
world
opinion,
before
the
workers’
movement
and
before
the
Arab
world,
that
we
shall
not
accept
the
idea
of
a
Jewish
state,
which
would
eventually
mean
Jewish
domination
of
Arabs
in
Palestine”
(1931).
When
Ben-Gurion
became
the
Prime
Minister
of
Israel
in
1948,
however,
he
ensured
that
the
dispossessed
Palestinians
roam
the
earth
as
exiles
with
no
provision
for
their
“right
of
return”
(the
crucial
voice
vote
was
taken
on
16
June
1948
by
the
cabinet
of
the
Provisional
Government
of
Israel).[v]
Zionism
is
at
times
reduced
to
Sharonism,
although
it
remains
in
struggle
with
its
contradictions.
Sharonism
has
no
time
for
contradictions.
It
begins
its
active
career
on
9
April
1948,
when
Menachem
Begin’s
Irgun
massacred
two
hundred
and
fifty-four
residents
of
Deir
Yassin.[vi]
Begin
followed
the
racist
callousness
of
Israel’s
first
President
Chaim
Weizmann
who
said
that
the
British
informed
him,
“There
are
a
few
hundred
thousand
Negroes
[in
pre-1948
Palestine],
but
that
is
a
matter
of
no
significance.”[vii]
When
you
render
human
beings
insignificant,
it
is
license
to
mass
murder.
Sharonism
has
used
at
least
two
techniques
to
remove
the
Palestinians
from
the
area,
its
settlements
and
closure.
(a)
Settlements.
The
point
of
Sharonism
is
to
remove
the
Palestinians
from
a
land
that
it
claims
was
deeded
to
the
Jews
by
God.
From
1948
to
1967,
Sharonism
acted
cautiously,
mainly
because
any
overt
attempt
to
colonize
the
land
would
have
been
met
by
the
united
Arab
armies,
here
under
the
charge
of
Nasserism.
Sharonism
lay
relatively
dormant
in
these
years,
but
for
forays
into
instances
of
brutality
such
as
those
orchestrated
by
Ariel
Sharon
himself
at
Qibya
(when
Sharon’s
Unit
101
killed
at
least
seventy
Palestinians
in
1953).[viii]
The
IDF’s
victory
in
1967
transformed
the
Israeli
establishment’s
view
of
itself.
Take
Minister
of
Defense
Moshe
Dayan
as
an
illustration.
In
June
1967,
Dayan
told
the
troops,
“Soldiers
of
Israel,
we
have
no
goals
of
conquest.
Our
single
purpose
is
to
put
to
naught
the
Arab
armies’
attempt
to
conquer
our
land.”
Then,
three
years
later,
he
noted
that
from
1948
to
1967
the
establishment
had
been
content
with
the
boundaries
of
Israel
as
defined
by
Gun
Zionism,
“we
had
fought
to
reach
the
summit;
we
were
content
with
what
we
had
achieved.”
With
the
new
aggression
of
the
IDF,
“We
thought
we
had
reached
the
summit,
but
it
became
clear
to
us
that
we
were
still
on
the
way
up
the
mountain.
The
summit
is
higher
up.”[ix]
The
“summit,”
in
sum,
is
the
expulsion
of
the
Palestinians
from
the
vicinity.
From
1967
to
1977,
under
the
Labor
governments
of
Meir
and
Rabin,
the
Israeli
state
built
ninety
settlements
on
the
West
Bank
(cost:
$350
million)
and
rejected
the
idea
of
a
Palestinian
state
(when
we
hear
about
the
PLO’s
rejection
of
Israel,
we
should
put
it
in
this
context).
When
Begin
of
Likud
came
to
power
in
1977,
he
was
even
more
belligerent.
“What
occupied
territories,”
he
said,
“If
you
mean
Judea,
Samaria
and
the
Gaza
Strip,
they
are
liberated
territories,
part
of
the
land
of
Israel.”
Begin
brought
Ariel
Sharon,
already
famous
for
his
brutality
against
Arabs
in
the
1950s,
in
as
his
Minister
of
Agriculture,
which
was
another
way
to
say
Minister
of
Colonization.
In
June
1979,
Sharon
offered
a
preview
of
his
current
tactics:
“In
another
year,
settlement
activity
might
be
impossible.
So
we
must
act
now
–
to
settle
vigorously,
quickly.
First
of
all
to
establish
facts
of
foothold,
and
then
to
beautify
the
settlements,
plan
them,
expand
them”
(New
York
Times,
16
June
1979).
The
State
put
funds
toward
the
creation
of
the
settlements,
a
policy
that
inevitably
made
the
Oslo
accords
of
1993
a
failure.
Since
Oslo,
Sharonism
vigorously
promoted
the
construction
of
the
settlements
in
the
three
zones
bequeathed
to
the
PA.
During
his
first
year
in
office
as
a
man
of
peace,
Ehud
Barak
in
1999-2000,
mainly
Sharonists
and
orthodox
Jews
constructed
almost
two
thousand
settlements;
during
the
reign
of
the
right,
Netanyahu,
the
rate
was
less
(1,160
units
in
1997).
Between
1993
(Oslo)
and
2000
(the
al-Aqsa
intifada),
the
total
settler
population
increased
from
110,000
to
195,000
or
seventy-seven
percent.
The
annual
rate
of
implantation
has
been
4,200
(from
1967
to
1993)
and
12,000
(from
1994
to
2000).
To
connect
these
settlements,
the
Israeli
state
expropriated
land
for
roads,
spent
almost
$200
million
to
build
highways
and
cut
down
15,000
trees
(many
of
them
in
olive
groves).
Many
of
these
roads,
as
we
shall
see
below,
constrain
the
movement
of
the
Palestinian
population,
especially
since
these
are
heavily
fortified
by
the
IDF
to
protect
the
settlers.[x]
Here
is
Columbia
University
Professor
Edward
Said:
“The
Gaza-based
Palestine
Center
for
Human
Rights
has
documented
the
‘sweepings’
of
olive
groves
and
vegetable
farms
by
the
Israeli
army
(or,
as
it
prefers
to
be
known,
Israel
Defense
Force)
near
the
Rafah
border,
for
example,
and
on
either
side
of
the
Gush
Katif
settlement
block.
Gush
Katif
is
an
area
of
Gaza
–
about
40
percent
–
occupied
by
a
few
thousand
settlers,
who
can
water
their
lawns
and
fill
their
swimming
pools,
while
the
1
million
Palestinian
inhabitants
of
the
strip
(800,000
of
them
refugees
from
former
Palestine)
live
in
a
parched,
water-free
zone.”
The
Israeli
state
controls
the
water
supply
of
the
occupied
territories
and
is
able
to
conduct
a
water
war
against
the
Palestinians
just
as
they
conduct
a
land
war.[xi]
(b)
Closure.
After
Oslo,
in
March
1993,
the
IDF
began
a
policy
called
“closure”
to
enclose
the
Palestinians
into
a
Bantustan
type
arrangement.
Israel
holds
the
key
to
Palestinian
survival
because
almost
eighty
percent
of
the
Palestinian
trade
is
with
Israel.
If
the
borders
are
closed,
the
people
starve.
From
1993,
the
Israeli
state
insisted
that
Palestinians
carry
a
permit
to
enter
Israel
(whereas
from
1967
there
had
been
no
such
provision)
and
in
1998,
the
Israeli
state
only
allowed
married
men
and
women
over
twenty
three
to
obtain
permits.
With
routine
checkpoints
and
harassment,
getting
to
work
became
a
serious
problem
for
the
Palestinians.
Sara
Roy
calculates
that
between
1993
and
1996,
the
Israeli
government
imposed
342
days
(Gaza)
and
291
days
(West
Bank)
of
total
closure.
In
1996,
as
a
result
of
closure,
Gaza’s
GNP
slipped
by
almost
forty
percent
while
that
of
the
West
Bank
by
almost
twenty
percent.
The
World
Bank
noted,
“The
annual
costs
of
closure
and
permit
policies
at
about
11-18
percent
of
GNI
[Gross
National
Income]
in
the
West
Bank
and
31-40
percent
in
the
Gaza
Strip
for
the
period
1994-96.”[xii]
In
the
decade
before
the
al-Aqsa
Intifada,
Sara
Roy
shows
us
how
the
Oslo
ghetto
has
devastated
the
everyday
lives
of
Palestinians:
unemployment
during
the
1990s
rose
nine
fold
between
1992
and
1996,
real
gross
GNP
fell
by
over
eighteen
percent
and
real
per
capita
GNP
fell
by
an
even
more
dramatic
thirty
seven
percent.
“The
reasons
for
Palestinian
economic
regression,”
Roy
argues,
“are
many
and
interrelated
but
turn
on
one
primary
axis:
Israel’s
closure
policy,
which
restricts
and
at
times
bans
the
movement
of
labor
and
goods
from
the
occupied
West
Bank
and
Gaza
Strip
to
Israel,
to
each
other,
and
to
external
markets,
represents
the
single
most
deleterious
factor
shaping
the
nature
of
Palestinian
economic
activity
and
Palestinian
life
in
general”[xiii]
Roy
offers
one
more
indication
of
Sharonism:
separation.
In
1999
Ehud
Barak
ran
on
the
platform,
“Peace
Through
Separation:
We
Are
Here;
They
Are
There.”
Checkpoints,
walls,
fences,
trenches,
bridges,
canals
and
tunnels
formed
the
pieces
of
Barak’s
vision
and
its
crowning
glory
was
an
electrified
fence
around
the
Gaza
Strip.
From
March
2001,
when
Sharon
came
to
power
he
set
the
IDF
in
motion
to
dig
two
meter
trenches
to
close
off
the
65,000
people
who
live
in
Ramallah
–
cutting
them
off,
as
Roy
notes,
“not
only
from
work
but
from
hospitals,
health
clinics,
and
schools.”[xiv]
The
point
of
closure
(and
separation)
is
to
inflict
significant
pain
on
the
Palestinian
people
so
that
they
may
leave
the
moth-eaten
state
of
the
PA
for
greener
pastures.
On
29
September
2000,
Ariel
Sharon,
with
a
thousand
IDF
guards,
visited
the
mosque
at
al-Aqsa
in
PA
controlled
East
Jerusalem
to
“inspect
and
ascertain
that
freedom
of
worship
and
free
access
to
the
Temple
Mount
is
granted
to
everyone.”
The
vulgarity
of
Sharon’s
test
of
freedom
when
the
Palestinians
are
held
in
captivity
did
not
escape
the
young
people
who
inaugurated
the
most
recent
uprising,
the
al-Aqsa
Intifada.
It
arose,
Sara
Roy
notes,
“in
response
to
Israel’s
continued
attempt
to
fragment
and
weaken
the
Palestinian
community
through
dispossession,
denial
and
closure.”[xv]
In
search
of
a
pretext,
the
IDF
took
the
assassination
of
Zeevi
as
the
pretext
for
its
inhuman
assault
on
the
Palestinian
population
of
the
Occupied
Territories,
sometimes
euphemistically
called
the
PA.
The
Oslo
Accords
that
produced
this
sham
of
freedom
did
not
change
the
fundamental
relationship
between
the
Israeli
state
and
the
Palestinian
people
–
one
of
colonial
domination
in
all
aspects
of
life.
What
the
PA
had
was
the
right
to
manage
only
a
short
list
of
subjects,
in
a
sense
similar
to
most
of
the
comprador
regimes
that
worked
under
the
heel
of
the
colonial
master.
But
people
with
a
long
history
of
struggle,
who
chaff
at
the
bit
placed
on
them
by
the
US
and
the
Israeli
state,
staff
the
PA.
From
the
standpoint
of
the
Israeli
state,
any
motion
on
their
part
is
tantamount
to
terrorism.
Devastated
by
the
1967
war,
the
Palestinians
regrouped
in
Jordan,
began
raids
on
Israel,
and
then
faced
the
wrath
of
King
Hussein’s
Bedouin
army
and
Brigadier
Zia
ul-Haq’s
Pakistani
army
(27
September
1970):
King
Hussein,
son
of
the
first
king
of
Jordan
installed
by
the
British
in
1921
and
grandson
of
Emir
Hussein
of
Mecca,
thwarted
the
strategy
of
PFLP
leader
George
Habash,
“The
liberation
of
Palestine
will
come
through
Amman
[capital
of
Jordan].”
The
PLO
fled
to
Beirut,
to
take
shelter
in
Lebanese
liberalism.
Ruled
by
the
Christian-fascist
Falange,
Lebanon
made
a
deal
with
Sharon
to
kick
out
the
PLO
from
its
base.
“We
are
here
to
destroy
once
and
for
all
the
PLO
terrorists,”
said
Sharon
on
12
June
1982
and
a
few
months
later,
on
16
September,
the
IDF,
under
his
command,
urged
and
equipped
the
Falange
to
enter
the
Palestinian
camps
of
Sabra
and
Shatila
and
massacre
at
least
three
thousand
five
hundred
people.
Begin,
of
Irgun
fame,
refused
to
conduct
an
inquiry
and
blamed
the
events
on
“the
bloodthirsty
plot
being
hatched
against
Israel
and
its
government.”
Four
hundred
thousand
people
protested
in
Tel
Aviv
on
25
September
and
forced
the
regime
to
form
the
Kahane
Commission
(whose
report
relieved
Begin
of
“a
certain
degree
of
responsibility”
and
called
for
the
dismissal
of
Sharon
and
of
Raphael
Eytan,
which
did
not
happen
--
both
became
members
of
the
Knesset
and
then
Sharon
was
elevated
to
the
top
post
in
the
land).
The
PLO
fled
to
Tunisia
and
waited
there,
in
a
relatively
quiet
exile,
until
the
1987
Intifada
erupted
(along
with
Hamas)
and
brought
the
Israelis
to
the
table
in
Spain
and
then
in
Oslo
to
allow
the
PLO
to
return.
For
Sharonism,
the
return
of
the
PLO
was
a
hiatus
–
its
departure
was
always
on
the
cards.
When
all
reasonable
opposition
is
squashed,
what
else
must
come
but
the
suicide
bomber?
The
suicide
bomber
is
not
a
result
of
some
malady
in
Palestinian
or
Islamic
culture,
but
it
is
the
end
result
of
an
ill-fated
policy
since
1967
to
render
the
Palestinians
without
the
means
to
craft
their
destiny.
This
is
not
to
say
that
the
Israeli
people
deserve
what
they
get.
Far
from
it,
it
is
to
say
that
Sharonism
produced
the
terrible
social
conditions
that
led
to
this
impasse.
Sharonism,
via
the
Jordanian
army,
the
Falange
and
the
IDF,
went
after
the
left
Palestinians,
thereby
creating
a
vacuum
filled
earnestly
by
groups
like
Hamas.
Sharonism
is
the
end
of
debate,
because
it
went
after
reasonable
people
with
its
weapons,
produced
a
desert
of
political
opinion,
and
then
used
that
as
an
excuse
for
further
barbarity.
Meanwhile,
the
Palestinians
continue
to
suffer
and
the
US
pities
Sharon
for
his
dilemma.
Meanwhile,
children
stuck
within
homes,
afraid
that
they
will
be
the
next
martyrs
in
the
crossfire,
memorize
the
poems
of
Mahmoud
Darwish…
I
saw
nothing
but
a
scaffold
With
one
single
rope
for
two
million
necks
I
see
armed
cities
of
paper
that
bristle
With
kings
and
khaki
3.
The
US-Israeli
Union.
The architect of Sharonism is not just Sharon, but also US neoconservatives like Irving Kristol, who just over a decade ago wrote, “A Palestinian state in Gaza would be nothing more than an armed camp for intransigent irredentists who would be at permanent war with Israel. Why should Israel agree to any such scenario? It won’t, since it would only end up having to occupy Gaza all over again. The million or so Palestinian refugees -- by now mainly children and grandchildren of the original refugees -- did not come from the West Bank, have no family connections on the West Bank, have no memories of the West Bank.”[xvi] These Palestinians, in words similar to Golda Meir, have no right to belong, since they don’t exist. This is the ideology of Fortress Israel – barricade oneself behind the IDF and inflict enormous pain on anyone who may try to resist your armed might. This is all very well as a Sharonist doctrine for those who live in Israel, but why does the US support Israel regardless of its outlaw actions (against Resolution 242 of the UN that asks it to leave the Occupied Territories) and the difficult position it leaves the US’s Arab allies in the region?
Drawing from the cultural images of anti-Semitism, some speculate that it is the “Jewish Lobby” in the US that is to blame. Not only is this factually hard to verify, but it does not sit well for a Marxist framework (groups do not simply buy their influence, as the liberals argue, but certain classes exercise control over the state form and its managers structurally operate on behalf of or at the behest of the dominant classes). As most electoral and campaign dollar data shows, the “Jewish Lobby” tends to lean toward the Democratic Party, so why do the Republicans operate on behalf of Israel as well?[xvii] The Republican Party has very close ties to the petro-Sheikhs, mainly because it is a party soaked with oil money and oily men: from Bush and Cheney downwards. Bush’s Energy Secretary, Spencer Abraham, is an Arab American (the first ever) and Bush has a long history of friendship and partnership with Arab businessmen. In 1990, Bush made almost a million dollars in a deal bankrolled by the emirate of Bahrain (Harken, a tiny Texas company that had Bush on its board, won a contract in Bahrain against the giant Amaco, mainly because of Bush’s contacts with his father, the then President).[xviii] On the board of Harken, beside Bush, was Talat Othman, recently hauled in for questioning by the US Justice Department for being an important figure in the Islamic charities it had raided. Othman, who offered the benediction at the Republican National Convention in 2000, joined up with Republican strategist Grover Norquist and Khaled Saffuri to create the Islamic Institute to draw conservative Muslims into its orbit. The Bush family and the Republican Party are knee deep in the mire of two kinds of fundamentalism: the market variety and that peddled by the mullahs and the priests. So why does the US back Israel?
The US, which hitherto had been only a partial “friend” to Israel, became a firm ally after the 1967 war. In 1958, Eisenhower forged a deal with the Saudi regime so that the defense of the peninsula’s autocracy became part of the US’s national interest. The US government made a strategic alliance with the forces of militant Islam to undermine both Communism and Nasserism, mainly to protect the oil lands from the left (and the Soviet Union). Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim’s coup in Baghdad in that same year demonstrated the instability of the US alliance with the monarchies (this would be repeated in Iran twenty years later). When Israel showed that it could be the gendarme of US imperialism, money and military equipment moved to shore it up. Sadat, the liaison between the Egyptian army and the right-wing Muslim Brotherhood, made a bargain with Israel at Camp David (1978) and became the second largest recipient of US aid. The US support for Israel essentially brought this renegade Arab state in line, this after Egypt defeated Israel in the 1973 war.[xix] US support for Israel, then, is not just for the preservation of a Jewish State (if it is that at all); it is mainly as a wedge to discipline the petro-Sheikh allies. Additionally, Israel offers US allies like the Sadatian regime in Egypt (now in Mubarak’s hands) the opportunity to pretend to be pro-Palestinian and yet, pro-American: the leadership can fulminate against Israel, tell the “street” that it is with the people (represented among the Arab masses by the Palestinians), just as it stands in line before the trough of US aid. US investment in Israel, therefore, is marked by a measure of pragmatism and racism. Racism because of this widespread establishment idea that the Arab is not to be trusted; pragmatism because if you have one loyal ally in the region, then you can use it to ensure that the others (such as Saudi Arabia) stay in line.
4. Hindutva and Sharonism: Subcontractors of US imperialism.
And why does the Indian government ignore Arafat and stand in silence behind Israel?
On 7 August 1958, Jawaharlal Nehru explained why India had no diplomatic personnel in Israel even as India recognized that country two years before. “This attitude,” he told the Parliament, “was adopted after a careful consideration of the balance of forces. It is not a matter of high principle, but it is based on how we could best serve and be helpful in that area. We should like the problem between Israel and the Arab countries to be settled peacefully. After careful thought we felt that while recognizing Israel as an entity we need not at this stage exchange diplomatic personnel.” No stranger to the dispute, in 1947, the Indian government proposed a plan as a member of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine to create a federal state with autonomy for the Jewish residents of Palestine. The plan was rejected, and India joined the Arab nations to oppose the partition of the region. Nehru opened the doors to diplomatic association in the 1950s (notably when the Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Walter Eytan, visited India in 1952), but with the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the growth of Arab nationalism, the government remained reluctant to established diplomatic ties. For almost four decades, the Indian government, mainly led by the Congress, stayed close to Arab nationalism and refused to engage in diplomatic relations with Israel as long as the Arab-Israeli problem remained unsettled.
Then, in 1992, the Congress-led government sent an envoy to Israel and diplomatic relations began in earnest. There are two reasons for the turnabout, one the Congress’ entry into the neoliberal regime set-up by the IMF in cahoots with global capital, and two the Congress reassessed the world’s power equation in the post-Cold War era and saw itself as a player in the Indian Ocean region, akin to Israel’s role as the gendarme of the oil lands on behalf of the US. If Israel could attain semi-world power status by its ruthless foreign policy and lack of concern for the values of non-aligned cooperation, then India, now a pretender on the world stage, should follow the same playbook. But even the Congress-led government was chary about a full-fledged alignment with both the US and Israel, mainly because of deep ties with the Arab world as well as because of economic and military ties with powers that still opposed US imperialism (Russia, for instance).
The ground shifted in 1998 when the Hindu-Right forged a coalition government, exploded nuclear weapons and proceeded to reach out to both the US and Israel, trying to create a Washington-Tel Aviv-New Delhi entente against Communism and Islam – the two problem ideologies as posed by US political scientist Samuel Huntington’s style of fundamentalist geopolitics. When Defense Minister Jaswant Singh visited Israel in July 2000 he said that the relationship between the two countries was strained due to “domestic polices because of a Muslim vote bank.”[xx] The anti-Muslim tenor of this statement played to the Sharonist galleries and offers us a window of why the forces of Hindutva are so eager to make an anti-Islam alliance with those of Sharonism. Over the past three years, the relationship has flourished with high level delegations making trips to each country, and with trade in harmless and harmful (namely, arms) goods on the increase with each year. Until the invasion put them in doubt, the two governments had planned a large celebration for the tenth anniversary of normal diplomatic relations, with presidential visits and with stamps released in both countries to commemorate the friendship. In addition, the right-wing Prime Minister of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee had planned to release his newest book of poems in Hebrew. Even as the Arab-Israeli troubles continues and as the Israeli-right emboldens itself in its war against the PA, the BJP-led rightist government crafts a special relationship with Israel.
Before the 1967 War, the Hindutva Right did not hold any special brief for that west Asian country. In fact, the leaders of the Hindutva Right held Hitler in reverence, an ideological affinity that circumvented any turn toward Israel. Savarkar was feted by the Nazi press in the 1940s for his enthusiasm at the Blitzkrieg. His heir, Golwalkar, reflected on the Holocaust and concluded: “Race pride at its highest has been manifested here. Germany has shown how well-nigh impossible it is for Races and Cultures, having differences going to the root, to be assimilated into one united whole, a good lesson for us in Hindustan to learn and profit by.” Indeed, this philosophy remains at the heart of Hindutva.
A reassessment of Israel came in the aftermath of the 1967. The Hindutva forces were disappointed that India’s defeat of Pakistan in the war of 1971 was not followed by a similar humiliation of the enemy. Israel slowly became the model, not only for its military brashness, but also for the possibility of a Hindutva-Sharonist alliance against Islam. When the first al-Fatah delegation made an official visit to India in the early 1970s, the Hindu Right political party was the only one to conduct protests against its presence.
Hindutva’s alliance with the rightist tendencies in Israel is not so strange after all, because at the ideological level Hindutva is much like Sharonism, for both extol the importance of the Race-State, and both cast aspersions at the presence of a Muslim minority. If the activists of Hindutva yell “Jao Kabristan ya Pakistan” to Indian Muslims, those of Sharonism follow Golda Meir in the belief that “there is no such thing as a Palestinian.” An Indian-born analyst at the Zionist Freeman Center in Houston (Texas) makes just this connection: “Islamic fascists see Bharat [India] as a soft spot to propagate their irrational creed and foment violence. India tries to placate them. Israel expels them. This is what Bharat should do. If they hate Hindu Rashtra so much they are free to leave for dar-ul Islam.” India must learn from Israel, to act against Pakistan, for instance, in much the same way as the IDF acts against the PA.
The visits of official delegations from the two countries indicate their mutual interests. When the Israelis travel to India, in train come a number of arms manufacturers and military personnel. So during the 21 November 2001 Israeli visit to the Indian Defense Ministry in New Delhi, the team included the head of weapons development and infrastructure in the Israeli Defense Ministry, Mapat (Major General Dr. Yitzhak Ben-Israel), the head of the department for security exports, Sibat (Major General Yossi Ben-Hanan), the deputy director of foreign affairs (Brigadier General Yekutiel Mor).[xxi] When India’s Home Minister L. K. Advani made his high-level visit to Israel he took with him the home secretary (Kamal Pandey), the director of the Central Bureau of Investigations (S. K. Raghavan) and the director of the Intelligence Bureau (Shyamal Dutta). Israel is eager to sell arms to India, while India is eager to learn anti-terrorism measures from the Israeli Shin Bet.[xxii] These are the practical components of the Indo-Israeli alliance of our period.
The Hindutva Right is not the only ones in India to have ties with the Israeli government. The Indian armed forces and intelligence agencies have a long association with their counterparts in Israel. During the Indo-China War of 1962 and the two conflicts with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, Israel provided small arms and ammunition for Indian troops (a provision not well-known at the time). In January 1963, a few months after India’s border war with China, the Indian government reached out to the Israeli military establishment and opened a dialogue. Two years later, Israeli cabinet minister Yigal Alon visited India. But the deals in the years before 1992 took place very secretly, harbored for the most part behind the doors of the intelligence wings of both countries. RAW and Mossad began relations in the late 1960s and it was this association that enabled Dayan to visit India in the 1970s. The Israeli army and intelligence is well known for its secrecy and RAW followed in those well-trod footprints: information about Israeli-Indian contacts is not easy to find, but for the occasional statement by politicians or bureaucrats.[xxiii]
Since 1992, the relationship remained clandestine, with both sides wary of any open acknowledgement of the military ties. In March 1992, when Deputy Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs came to New Delhi to open the embassy, he told the press that “nobody told us of Indian needs in the areas of defense.” Not two months later Israeli defense industrialists came on an official visit to India to discuss arms purchases, but neither government went public to acknowledge the tour. Israel’s charge d’affaires Giora Becher noted that “it was not right time” to talk about the arms trade, and when challenged in Parliament, the Congress leader and Prime Minister noted that “we obviously know less than some of the members [of the opposition].”
Emboldened by the rise of the Hindu Right in India and the Sharonist Right in Israel, the militaries and arms manufacturers in both countries became more open about their relationship. The Confederation of Indian Industry, the Israeli Manufacturers Association, the Israeli Aircraft Industries exchanged delegations, and at the December 1993 Indian air show at Bangalore, the Sibat (the Foreign Defense Assistance and Defense Export Organization of the Israeli army) held the largest demonstration after the Russians. With the Russians unable to retrofit the old Soviet armaments, the Indians turned to Israeli expertise in this area.
India’s first shopping list was loaded with aircraft demands, mainly to replace the ailing MIG-21 and MIG-29 fleet. But by the time the Hindu Right took power in 1998, the list grew much longer and far more complex. It also reveals the sub-imperial ambitions of the Hindu Right over southern Asia. In May 1998, a few days after the nuclear tests, a delegation from Israeli Aircraft Industries toured India to sell their pilotless aircraft anti-ship missiles. Components of a missile defense shield, then, have been in the works for India for at least three years. A set of deals have been signed between the arms merchants in India and Israel to buy goods for the airforce (MIGs, Light Combat Aircraft, AWACs), navy (aircraft carrier, maritime radar, attack craft), army (Main Battle Tank, Advanced Light Helicopters), and for the missile branch of the military (the Indian defense contractors want to buy Israeli guidance and launch systems for the Prithvi surface to surface missile, and for the sea to surface Sagarika system, but there is also evidence that India wants Israeli help with the Akash, a missile system akin to the M-11). These weapons would put India into contention as the main power not only in South Asia, but perhaps, as the second front against the Chinese (a move that enabled the US to revise its military doctrine to fight only one full-scale war; its proxy powers would take care of the other one, in the new scenario). Furthermore, the missile defense parts of the deals would enable India to fantastically suggest that Pakistan’s nuclear option had been neutralized, and that the parity of 1998 had been negated. India’s eagerness for the missile defense, then, is part of the desire of the Hindu Right to will away the 1998 Pakistani tests on the Chagai range.
If Israel’s defense industry sold India only a few million dollars worth of armaments in 1992, by the end of 2001, the amount increased to an astronomical $800 million per year, with contracts for several billion dollars worth of goods. As India and Pakistan sat down for talks in Agra (India) in mid-July 2001, the Indian and Israeli defense chiefs met in Lod (Israel) to conclude a $2 billion deal that will upgrade Indian fighter jets, provide India with Barak-type surface to surface missiles, and with parts of a missile defense package (unmanned aerial vehicles and radar systems).[xxiv] The radar system, known as Green Pine, is part of the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system deployed in Israel and it alone comes at a cost of $250 million. The unmanned aerial devices cost $300 million and some of them from an earlier purchase have already been deployed by the Indian military (they saw action during the 1999 Kargil engagement) The IAI indicated last year that a further $2 billion in arms sales would follow the July 2001 contract; in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, the US virtually ended the sanctions regime on India and thereby has increased the chances of a further arms build-up in India due to the IAI’s supply channels. Only the US buys more arms from Israel than India at this time. Israel is now India’s second largest arms supplier after Russia.
Conventional weapons are not the only interest. Twice before the 1998 nuclear tests by India in Pokhran, India’s leading nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Kalam visited Israel. After his June 1996 visit, the two countries began to cooperate earnestly on sales of missile technology to India. When Israeli defense personnel and defense industrialists visit India, it is well known that they make a stop to see Dr. Abdul Kalam whose title was Scientific Advisor to the Ministry of Defense, but who is known for his crucial role in nuclear weapons development. Both governments deny any cooperation on the nuclear front, but the materials available seem to suggest that some element of discussion and assistance might have been involved.[xxv]
Just a few days after India announced the establishment of diplomatic ties with Israel, Ya’acov Lapidot, the Director General of the Israeli Police Ministry after a visit to India told the press that Israel was ready to give India help in the field of law and order, notably in the suppression of terrorism. Benjamin Netanyahu, then a junior minister in the government, told the Indian press that Israel “had developed expertise in dealing with terrorism at the field level and also internationally at the political and legal level, and would be happy to share it with India.” In late February of 1992, India’s Defense Minister Sharad Pawar said that the new relations allowed India to draw “Israel’s successful experience to curb terrorism.”[xxvi]
When the BJP-led government came to power in 1998, the issue of terrorism took on a new urgency, since this government was prone to depict any act of violence by a Muslim as terrorism, and consequently any act of violence by a Hindu as either self-defense or the resentment of years of tyranny. In 1994, Advani visited Israel as leader of the opposition and has since developed warm ties with the Sharonist elements in the Israeli establishment. When Advani returned in 1995 he met Netanyahu, who presented him with a book on terrorism. Since then Advani has made it a practice to quote from that book when he speaks about terrorism, particularly the following: "Terrorism is a deliberate and systematic murder of fundamental rights of the civilians and of terrorizing them for a political gain. Free society must reject absolutely the notion that `one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.'” In other words, even as this is a rather opaque quote, the PLO (for Israel) and the various Kashmiri militant groups (for India) are terrorists regardless of any political claims they may have.
During his visit in 2000, Advani, now as Home Minister, said that he wanted to learn how Israel has dealt with Islamic fundamentalism. “Israel’s Mossad has proved itself to be an expert in this field,” he said and he hoped that the Indian agencies would learn “some of the finer aspects of intelligence gathering from the Israelis,” notably from Mossad and Shin Bet. “Israel and India have both grappled with [terrorism] during the last two decades,” he noted. “Terrorist organizations are now known to establish and have international linkages. This makes it necessary for the countries which are victims of such terrorism to learn from the experience of each other.”[xxvii] Rumors of Israeli agents alongside Indian troops in Kashmir frequently make their way among the press corps in New Delhi and in Tel Aviv, but there is nothing substantive to make a story. But it is certainly the case that Israel offered support during the Kargil campaign in 1999, it has advised India on techniques to close the Line of Control (similar to Israel’s attempts to close the border with the PA), and in early January 2002, Israel Defense Minister Shimon Peres told the Mumbai press that Israel is ready to help India deal with Pakistan after the 13 December 2001 attack on parliament, but “it depends on India, what it wants and we are available.”[xxviii]
India and Israel could not be major players in the US-UK’s Fifth Afghan War, because, as the Pakistanis made clear, the coalition must have an Islamic face. Nevertheless, the aftermath of 9/11 and of the war reveals certain trends toward the creation of a Tel Aviv-New Delhi-Washington axis that will have an important role in the southern and western parts of Asia. In January 2002, the US cleared the sale of the Israeli Phalcon early warning radar systems to India (a deal worth $1 billion); the US had earlier stopped the deal with the argument that it might escalate tensions in the subcontinent. Now with tensions at war point, the US allows the sale. Meanwhile, the Chinese sold two squadrons (46) of F-7 MG fighter jets to Pakistan, a sale that enables the Pakistani Air Force to reach aerial parity with India. India wants to emulate the Israeli path to being a regional power with international prestige, at whatever the social or human cost. Israel sees India as a vast market for its arms, and as an ally against what it calls the Islamic world. The US, under the right, is eager to see a new configuration that includes India and Israel to encircle both Islam and Communism, to dispatch the new bogeymen of the 21st Century. Meanwhile, the IDF tanks and helicopters ruthlessly besiege the Palestinians. These are dark times.
[i] The narrative that follows below is drawn from several issues of the Jerusalem-based monthly magazine, Between the Lines, from the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz, and from the New York Times.
[ii] Since 1967, the US government has tendered almost $100 billion in military assistance to Israel. When it was clear that the IDF used US-made Apache helicopters for their targeted killings, the US government noted, “US weapons sales do not carry a stipulation that the weapon can’t be used against civilians. We cannot second guess an Israeli commander who calls in helicopter gunships” (4 October 2000).
[iii] Ben Halpern, The Idea of the Jewish State, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.
[iv] There are now several rich histories of pre-Israel Palestine, such as Beshara Doumani, Rediscovering Palestine. Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700-1900, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
[v] Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World, New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970, p. 248 (1925) and p. 291 (1931) and Benny Morris, “Falsifying the Record: A Fresh Look at Zionist Documentation of 1948,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Spring 1995, p. 56 (1948).
[vi] There is an excellent account in David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch, London: Faber and Faber, 1977, pp. 126-127.
[vii] Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy, Boston: South End Press, 1992, Afterword.
[viii] “Return of the Terrorist: the Crimes of Ariel Sharon,” Counterpunch, 7 February 2001.
[ix] Cohen, Israel and the Arab World, p. 538 (Dayan during the war) and Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch, pp. 220-221 (Dayan after the war).
[x] Mouin Rabbani, “A Smorgasbord of Failure: Oslo and the Al-Aqsa Intifada,” The New Intifada. Resisting Israel’s Apartheid, Ed. Roxane Carey, London: Verso Books, 2001, pp. 76-77.
[xi] Edward Said, “Palestinians Under Siege,” The New Intifada, p. 28.
[xii] Sara Roy, “Decline and Disfigurement: The Palestinian Economy After Oslo,” The New Intifada, p. 100.
[xiii] Roy, “Decline and Disfigurement,” p. 92
[xiv] Roy, “Decline and Disfigurement,” p. 102.
[xv] Roy, “Decline and Disfigurement,” p. 103.
[xvi] Irving Kristol, “Who Needs a Peace in the Middle East?” Wall Street Journal, 21 June 1989.
[xvii] Although this is not as strong as it used to be. Murray Friedman, “Are American Jews Moving to the Right?” Commentary, April 2000.
[xviii] I tell this story in Fat Cats and Running Dogs: The Enron Stage of Capitalism (2002).
[xix] I tell this story in War Against the Planet: The Fifth Afghan War, US Imperialism and Other Assorted Fundamentalisms, New Delhi: LeftWord, 2002.
[xx] John Cherian, “Sharon’s War,” Frontline, 22 December 2001.
[xxi] Arieh O’Sullivan, “New Deals sealed with New Delhi,” Jerusalem Post, 23 November 2001.
[xxii] “India Works with Israeli Intelligence,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 June 2000.
[xxiii] Manoj Joshi, “Changing Equations: The Coming Together of India and Israel,” Frontline, 4 June 1993.
[xxiv] “Israel, India Sign Agreement on Defense Industry Cooperation,” Xinhua News Service, 17 July 2001.
[xxv] Dominic Coldwell, “Still in the Closet, Barely,” Al-Ahram, 30 September 1999, Yossi Melman, “India’s visiting strongman wants to expand nuclear cooperation with Israel,” Ha’aretz, 16 June 2000 and Richard Norton-Taylor, “MPs question ‘nuclear upgrade’ of Israel’s Jaguar bombers,” The Guardian, 24 April 2002.
[xxvi] All this is from P. R. Kumaraswamy’s crucial study, India and Israel: Evolving Strategic Partnership, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, no. 40, September 1998.
[xxvii]
Chandan
Nandy,
“Advani
Focus
on
Israel
Terror
Tips,”
The
Telegraph,
31
May
2000.